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INTRODUCTION 
Ie The Problem 
Rudolf Otto's principal aim was the certification of religious 
knowledge on its own grounds. His discoveries and expositions 
have engaged the attention of thoughtful men of positions similar 
and dissimilar to his own. He has elicited critical notice from 
practically every philosopher of religion of the twentieth century. 
There have been few neutral notices, since mos t philosophers of 
religion and theologians have seen in his work either a notable 
bulwark or a serious threat to their own positionse Otto's episte-
mology is fundamental to all his work, dealing with the basic issues 
of philosophy of religion. 
The question may be raised as to whether or not Otto had a 
definite epistemological position. Otto follows Kant very largely 
in his basic philosophy, making signifi.cant departures from the 
path of the author of the Critique of Pure Reasone Otto's primary 
concern, like Kant's, is in t he problem of knowledgee It is not 
suggested that Otto's epistemology is to be understood in terms of 
a static position which may be labeled and classified, and then 
compared with other such positions. His epistemolog~cal presup-
positions covered more than can be included in the standard defi-
niti ons of epistemic positions~ His mature thought had roots in 
many types of mental soil, pietistic and rational, theological and 
i 
philosophical. His formulations therefore have many facets and 
shadings, the overlooking of any of which would impoverish the 
whole. 
The problem of this thesis is not simply to cons i der Otto as 
a representative of an epistemological position, and then to 
compare that position with others. It is, rather, to find the 
ground of his presuppositions, the method of his procedure, and 
the mature formulation of his thought with respect to the nature 
of knowledge and the knowing proce ss, especially as related to 
religious experience. 
II. Previous Work 
Hardly a writer in philosophy of r~ligion of the current 
century fails to refer to some phase of Rudolf Otto's work. Most 
often, reference is made to his book, Das Heilige, translated by 
J. W ~ Harvey and published in English in 1923, as The Idea of the 
Holz. This book is used as a standard reference along with 
William James' The Varieties of Religious Experiences in texts 
and other books for popular readership~ 1 Some of t h ese references 
are unlikely to give the reader any more than a superficial notion 
of the general position of the work c ited, . while the author making 
such reference is justified in his limited expositi on. Neverthe-
less, the impression may be created t hat the only important work 
of Rudolf Otto is contained in his best known book. It s h ould be 
1. See Knudson, VRE, chapter on "Immediacy and Truth 11 • 
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pointed out that rrhe Idee_ of the Holy is only one of several books 
which must be taken together to get his comprehensive formulations& 
In addition to The Idea of the Holy, this thesis will be con-
cerned principally with Otto's ·Philosophy of Religion, which was 
published in German in 1904, and published in English in 1931, 
I having been translated by E. B. Dicker. The other principal works 
of Otto which have been consulted in the preparation of this thesis 
.are: 
Naturalism and Religion, published in German in 1904, 
in English, 1907. 
Religious Essays, published in English in 1931. 
Mysticism East and West, published in German in 1926, 
in English in 1932. 
India's Religion of Grace and Christianity, published 
in German in 1930, and in English the same year. 
The Kingdom of God and the Son of Man, published in 
Gerraan in 1934, in Engl ish in 1938. 
Only two writers have published comprehensive works on Otto. 
John Morrison Moore has a chapter on "The A Priori in Rudolf Otto's 
Theory of Religious Experience" in his book Theories of Religious 
Experience, published in 1938 by the Round Table Press, Inc., of 
New York. Moore draws upon several of Otto's works, and makes 
important observations upon the relation of Otto's work to the 
total problems of religious experience. Robert F. Davidson has 
iii 
written a. book, Rudolf Otto's Interpretation of Religion, which 
was published in 1940 by Princeton University Press. This is a 
thorough study of Otto's thought from the standpoint of a. critical 
e.dmirer.. Dr. Davidson shows the rootage of Otto's thought in 
Lutheranism and also in the Neo- Friesian school of Post-Kantia.n 
Idealism. 
There are a few articles in scholarly journals which deal 
with some phase of Otto's thought~ The Journal of Theological 
Studies of April, 1924, carries an essay by John Oman which is the 
mos t notable of those discovered. In his very readable article, 
Oman seeks to state the position which Otto assumes concerning the 
subject of "The Idea of the Holyn. This is not a book-review, but 
rather a concise statement of Otto's foundational idea, and a 
penetrat ing analysis of it. 
In his monumental W?rk, The Problem of Religious Knowledge, 
published by Harper and Brothers in 1940, D. c. Macintosh has 
seven page s on the religious epistemology of Otto. He alludes to 
all of Otto's ma jor books, and shows a. strong disposition against 
Otto's positions. The criticisms which Macintosh brings to bear 
upon Ot to' s position will be considered in a section of this 
thesis. 
III. Method 
The method which will be followed in this thesis has already 
been suggested, in relation to the methods of Oman and Macintosh. 
iv 
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Oman in his article on "The Idea of the Holy", s ought to give a 
straightforward expositi on of Otto's views, with his own criticism 
then placed in perspective with the positive statement. Macintosh 
sought to discuss Otto under circumstances which obscured the 
positive position of Otto by coloring all his statements with the 
interpreter's own reactions. The former metho~ may be more 
laborious, since it at least strives f or an impartial statement 
of the position of another~ At least it allows a man to speak 
for himself before his ideas are refuted. Such a method has the 
added advantage of placing criticism on a plane where it will be 
readily distinguishable from mere col or ation. At this point, Oman 
far outscores Macintosh, for his criticism is no less penetrating, 
and far more constructive, than that of Macintosh. 
The outline of this thesis will suggest that the method to be 
followed is expository, analytic.al, and critical.. It will attempt 
first to discover the orientation of Otto's philosophy, to find 
the important features of his epistemology and finally to explore 
the criticisms which have been directed to Otto's conclusions by 
competent scholars. 
Fortunately, the bulk of Otto's work is available in competent 
English translation from the German in which it was written. The 
translations which are used for the major subjects of this thesis 
were done during Otto's lifetime, and bear his approval. It 
would seem unnecessary to introduce original translation under 
v 
these circumstances, or to exclude from research at this level 
those who are not prepared to indulge in original translation. 
vi 
CHAPTER ONE 
OTTO'S PHihOSOPHICAL AND RELIGIOUS ORIENTATION 
The thought of Rudolf Otto, especially in the field of 
epis temology, shows development over a period of years. It is 
evident that his work in epistemology initially was based on the 
Neo-Friesian interpretation of Kant's Critical philosophy, and 
that Otto proceeded through the years to the formulation of his 
idea of the "numinous", the religious a priori type or knowledge .. 
The initiation of this work is embodied in his Philosophy of 
Religion, subtitled Based on Kant and Fr ies, which was · written in 
1909. The mature formulation is found in The Idea of the .tioly, 
written in l917e From initiation to maturity there is an under-
lying stream of ideas and attitudes, and likewise there is a 
noticeable softening of emphasis on certain aspects and a definite 
deepening of certain convictions. Otto realized this progress in 
his thought, and points out some instances of shift in his positions. 
But it is also clear that the foundation of his thought persists 
throughout. 
Otto considered himself the disciple of a little-known German 
idealist of the Post-Kantian period, Jacob Friedrich Fries 
(1773-1843) .. 1 Fries was in turn a disciple of Kant. It is the 
1. Otto, POR,l5 ,. 
l 
contention of the Neo-Friesian School of Post-Kantian Idealism 
that the predominant followers of Kant in the nineteenth century 
were not thorough in their pursuit of Kantian method and spirit 
l to the extent to which Fries proved to be. Otto was associated 
in this Neo-Friesian movement with Leonard Nelson, professor of 
Philosophy at Gottingen, during his years there following the turn 
of the century. This revival of the Idealism of Fries, and the 
interpretation Nelson made of Kant's philosophy were to a large 
degree the moving forces behind Otto's own philosophical efforts* 
Before becoming involved in this movement his work had been 
similar to that which was characteristic of the dominant German 
theologians of his day8 His early interests were reflected in 
his first book, Luther's Idea of The Holy Spirit (1898), and in a 
commemoratory edition of Schleiermacher's Addresses on Religion 
(1899) with which he was associated. Luther and Schleiermacher 
remain reference points in his over-all thinking, but are basi-
cally overshadowed by Kant and Fries in his mature thought. 
The appearance of his own Philoso~hy of Religion in 1909 made 
a definite contribution to the literature of the Neo-Friesian 
School. The writings of the Neo-Friesian group are largely un-
noticed in American libraries since they appear, if at all, only 
in German. A collection of Leonard Nelson's Essays have been 
translated and published under the title The Socratic Method and 
l. Nelson, SMCP,l56. 
2 
Critical Philosophy. The corpus of the Neo-Friesian movement in 
German is reputed to be considerablea Whatever response this 
stream of German Idealism may have in contemporary American 
thought, it had a profound effect upon Otto. It formed the 
potential from which his significant achievements were realized. 
I. THE NEO-FRIESIAN THESIS 
I t i s Otto's contention that Fries was of sufficient philo-
sophical stature to have been ~ppointed to the chair at Berlin 
when Hegel's tenure beg n . He did not get this appointment, at 
least partly because of the social and political tendencies toward 
reaction, characteris tic of the times, according to Otto.1 Al low-
ing .for a certain amo·unt of enthusiasm for his philosophical master 
in Otto's feeling for F'r i es, it is significant for Otto that Fries 
was at least considered by his fellows for the highest position in 
his field which Germany had to offer. It is of little consequence 
to speculate upon the possible course of German Idealism in a 
Friesian epoch rather than in a Hegelian epoch.. It might be fruit-
ful, however, to keep in mind that Fries was among the peers of 
Hegel in the eyes of some of their own contemporaries. This will 
help to place Fries in a historical perspective which will more 
adequately warrant the attention which Otto gives to him. 
The principal f'eatures of the philosophy of Fries are 
1. 6tto, POR,26. 
enumerated by Otto as these: 
(a) The maintenance and application of the method 
of criticism~ 
{b) The exposure of the unnecessary, ufallacious 
inference from the apriority of knowledge to 
the ideality of the known, the object of that 
knowledge"~ 
(c) The clarification of the place of Immanence and 
Transcendence for conceptions and ideas. 1 
In his initial presentation of these distinctive features, Otto 
does not argue for their validity, but rather leaves that for the 
exposition of his own philosophy of religion as a whole. That 
exposition refers constantly to these points, using them as funda-
mental presuppositions. Otto does not simply presuppose their 
validity, however. He addresses himself to their certification, 
as well as to the problems which he proposes to solve by means 
of their use .. 
A. Kant's Critical Me thod 
In his Philosophy of Religion, Otto refers to Kant as the 
master of the critical method. 2 Otto understood that method, 
and used it intelligently. This is not denied even by his critics. 
Before looking into Otto's use of the critical method, it will be 
1~ Otto, POR,l6-20. 
2. Ot t o , POR,l8 .. 
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worthwhile to consider Kant's development of this method. 
Clark, in discussing Kant's philosophical procedure, says 
"Criticism, in a word, is an examination of the preconditions of 
our having any knowledge at all."l The work of th~ critic 
begins with the earliest examinable stages of the development of 
intelligence. He is not content to rely upon the traditional 
formula of knowledge, but pushes back the threshold of his in-
vestigation as far as he is able. 
Bowne says in this connection : 
This, in a word, was Kant's most general purpose, to 
criticize reason, to determine its limitations, a.nd to 
show that beyond the range of the speculative faculty 
lies the field of the practical life where, while we 
cannot demonstrate, we may yet believe.2 
In the last quoted sentence, Bowne is obviously referring to 
Kant's famous phrase 11 I have therefore found it ·necessary to deny 
knowledge, in order to ·make room for faith."3 Bowne feels that 
Kant was inspired by an ethical interest, a desire to free the 
belief in God, freedom and immortality from the unwholesome spec-
ulations of those philosophers who had failed to take account of 
the limitations of reason. Kant, according to Bowne, set out to 
secure those beliefs, which are not reached by reflection anyway, 
from the sceptical supposition that they can be destroyed by re-
flection. This, in t urn, would leave the higher spiritual interests 
I. Clark, IKP,29. 
2. Bowne, KAS,4. 
3. Kant, KRV,29. 
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free from sceptical attack.l 
Bowne is supported in his analysis by the analogy which Kant 
draws between his Critique and a policeman. The policeman has a 
negative function in preventing violence, but he also has a positive 
fm1ction in securing the peaceful enviornment of honest labor. In 
the same way, the insights provided by the critical method have a 
negative aspect, namely the determination of bounds and limits upon 
the speculations of reason, and in a negative aspect these insights 
prevent the unlimited use of speculation. 'I'he positive aspect is 
seen, however, in that the unwarranted extention of speculation does 
not strengthen and broaden the scope of reason, but rather weakens 
and narrows all its activity. The limitation of the theoretical 
reason makes room for the employment of the practical reason.2 
Kant calls his inquiry into the preconditions of knowledge 
the Critique of l=>ure Reason, to distinguish it from a so-called 
doctrine of pure reason, which might presuppose that the range of 
knowledge is greater than it has b een, or ever could be, known to 
be. He gives a fairly concise estimate of the words individually 
which collectively chai>acterize his work: 
Reason is the faculty which supplies the principles of 
a priori knowledge . Pure reason, is, therefore, that 
which contains the principles whereby we know anything 
absolutely a priori. An organon of pure reason would 
be the sum total of those principles according to which 
a.ll modes of pure a priori knowledge can be acquired 
and actually be brought into being. The exhaustive 
1. Bowne, KAS,4. 
2. Kant, KRV,26-27. 
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application of such an organon would give rise to a 
system of pure reason. ••••• I entitle transcendental 
all knowledge which is occupied not so much w~th objects 
a s with the mode of our knowledge of objects in so far 
as this mode of knowledge is to be possible a priori. 
••••• It is upon this inquiry, which should not be 
entitled a doctrine, but only a transcendental critique, 
that we are now engaged. Its purpose is not to extend 
knowledge, but only to correct it, and to apply a touch-
stone of value, or the lack of value, of all a priori 
knowledge.l 
It is Kant's desire, it would seem, to undercut so far as possible 
all existing theory of knowledge in order to discover and illumi-
nate knowledge and the knowing mind, to discern the place of ~ 
priori elements of knowledge, and to determine the limits of 
knowledge .. 
Kant distinguishes his method from what he calls "dogmatism", 
which "is thu s the dogmatic procedure of pure reason, without 
previous criticism of its own powers 11 • 2 He allies himself with 
his teacher Wolff, whom, he says, showed 
how the secure pr ogress of a science is to be attained 
only through orderly establishment of principles, clear 
determination of concepts, insistence upon strictness 
of proof, and avoidance of venturesome, non-consecutive 
steps in our inferences. 3 · 
While Kant is t he au t h or of' the book known as the Critique of 
Pure Reason, and while the word "Critique" appears in the title 
of some of his other books, he is indeed the progenitor of the 
of' the modern method which has come to be known as "criticalu. 
1. Kant, KRV,58-59. 
2. Kant, KRV,32. 
3. Kant, KRV,33. 
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Kant is not the first .philosopher to use this method in its 
broadest sense, but he set out deliberately to employ it in 
laying a foundation for all his further philosophical efforts. 
Thus is a very real sense, he may be called the master of the 
critique. 
The need or this method was recognized even in ancient 
philosophy. Aristotle, according to Leonard Nelson, confused the 
abstractive method or Socrates with an inductive method.l It 
remained for Kant, however, to clear up the misunderstanding, and 
to use the critical method with precision. The progressive-mathe-
matical procedure or Kant's German predecessors was in direct 
opposition to his critical method~ Kant called the searching out 
of these principles by logical analysis "metaphysical exposition", 
and the demonstration or their validity "transcendental deduction .. 11 2 
This regressive procedure alone does not suffice to insure 
against error. Analys is does not mark its own bounds. Some 
criterion needs to be established which will indicate whether or 
not regressive analysis has really discovered basic principles, 
or has only sifted out more funde~ental concepts which are them-
selves open to the danger or dogmatism. This criterion must rest 
on some foundation other than that or factual data, since no one 
could ever be sure that he had finally analyzed all the data which 
might bear upon a judgment. The critical method calls for a means 
I~ Nelson, SMC.P,lll. 
2. Nelson, SMCP,lll. 
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of elevating the mind above the purely factual in thought and 
feeling, so that principles may be secured against doubt or else 
opened to further analysisa 
Otto felt that the critical method brought Kant to his 
discovery of the a priori knowledge of pure reason, and to the 
formulation of the categories as the necessary principles of 
knowledge prior to all experience, by which experience may be 
known. Otto's own position is that Kant's critical method should 
be applied not only as Kant applied it, to distinguish phenomenal 
knowledge from metaphysical speculation, but also to the exposition 
of the grounds of the categories* He took up the method of Kant; 
and sought to extend its use even further. 
B. Friesian Augmentation of Kantian Idealism 
Otto and the other Neo-Friesians saw in Fries first and fore-
most a true follower of Kant in his methodology. Otto mentions 
this maintenance and extention of the method of criticism as the 
primary feature of Fries' philosophy (cf. page 4 above). The 
second feature, however, is the correction which Fries made in 
some aspects of Kant's use of criticism, and some of the con-
clusions he reached. According to Otto, Fries not only made 
signficiant corrections in Kant's conclusions, but he also added 
much that Kant left out. The method of Kant is still basic to 
Otto as it was to Fries, but the distinction of Fries' conclusions 
from those of Kant is of equal importance for the formulation of 
9 
· Otto's epistemology~ The strength of Otto's interpretation of 
Kant will be discussed at length in a later chapter~ 
Having pointed out the importance of the initiation of the 
critical method by Kant and its expansion by Fries 7 Otto proceeds 
to the second feature of Fries' philosophye 
It can be said in general that he made it one of the 
initial tasks of his philosophy to reveal Kant's 
particular and disastrous basic error, which brings 
into Kantian criticism that strange, uncertain 
twilight, harmful to many a student, which, too, 
has become so important for the progress of Kantian 
doctrine: the fallacious inference from the 
apriority of knowledge to the ideality of the known, 
the object of knowledge~l 
The importance of the nature of the objectivity of that to which 
a priori knowledge refers is made very clear . It may not be of 
primary importance to the student of the natural sciences to 
know whether the law he finds is, on the one hand, only a form of 
his ideas, or on the other hand, points to a world of reality and 
is obedient to that reality. Itis absolutely important to the 
religious man. If a religious man is to take seriously either 
religion or himself, he must be convinced that religious ideas are 
valid apart from his conception of them~ If the Kantian inference 
holds, Fries' correction being discredited, the very object of 
speculation may be destroyed.2 To Otto, as a philosopher of 
religion, this is disastrous in the extreme. rrhe whole of his 
work, through all the progressions of thought, is pivoted to his 
1. Otto, POR,l9. 
2. Otto, POR,l9. 
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conviction that this important correction of Kant by Fries is 
necessary. The key to his investigation into the field of com-
parative rel igion, into various historical type's of mysticism, 
and finally to his formulations in the idea of the numinous is 
to be found in this conviction. 
As Bowne pointed out, Kant's motivation was primarily ethical, 
and even religious.1 · It could not be said that he was less inter-
ested in the solidity of religious conviction than in the establish-
ment of scientific knowledge. But Otto does not impute this sort 
of secular ism to Kant& He rather points out the results which 
may come about when Kant's system is taken over by some of Otto's 
philosophical opponents who apparently did not share Kant's piety. 
Otto seeks, to secure the valuable features of Kant's system from 
employment in doing what Kant never intended: placing religious 
interests on a subordinate level of rati~nal activity. 
Otto's conviction of the possible knowledge of deity as 
objectively real undergirds all of his later work~ As he 
approaches the subject of religious feeling, and further the 
limits of knowledge and the nature of faith, he still works upon 
the foundation of this conviction. He outgrows much of the narrow 
limits or F'ries ian logic and formula, but his work really makes 
the best sense when seen against the background of this insight he 
gained t:rom Fries. The religious a priori, about which he had 
1. Bowne, KAS, 4. 
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serious questions in his earlier work, would have had no foundation 
on the basis of Kant's inference alonee The autonomous religious 
a priori which he developed later rests upon the conviction that 
a priori metaphysical categories have validity independently of 
the conceptions of the individual, equal in validity and intelli-
gibility, whether these categories refer to "natural objects" or 
to "religious objects" .. 
Fries is credited with further worthwhile augmentation of 
Kantian- philosophy in his insight into the status of Ideas. Fries 
carried the critical method further into the realm of ideas, and 
discovered that the ideas are necessary to all understanding, and 
that they arise from the immediate knowledge of pure reasone 
Through ideas there is cognition of the essence of things, which 
is something else than the perception of things in time and space., 
Idea is the conception of something which absolutely 
transcends all experience, which, moreover, cannot be 
applied to experience, like pure concepts of the under-
standing (Categories); and at the same time a concept 
which we must make necessary for ourselves from pure 
reasonel 
Knowledge of' things in time and space is limited, since it is good 
only for appearances, and not for the essence of things., By the 
pure concepts or ideas immediately known in the reason, however, 
the mind can know the essences of t hings. Thus Fries offers a 
clue to metaphysical reality which Kant left undisclosede Otto 
points out, also, that the limitation upon knowledge of appearances 
le Otto, POR,66 . 
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does not mean that appearance is fantasy or delusion arising 
from subjective states.. He uses the analogy of the appearance of 
a landscape through a mist. Such appearance is not appearance of 
nothing, nor is it clear and distinct. It is nvalid with limi-
tations"~ Awareness of the mist, its effect on vision will allow 
for a reflection upon what would be absent if the limitation was 
removed, although it will not necessarily give the positive results 
1 
of that removal, or supply positive actual knowledge. 
How does Fries improve upon Kant? Is there really any feature 
in the Ideal ism of Fries which surpasses Kant on Kantian grounds? 
Otto thinks that there is. This improvement is primarily in the 
area of metaphysical knowledge. Kant would go no further than to 
assert that knowledge begins and ends with the senses, that the 
objectivity of concepts and non-sensory reality, if there is such 
a reality, is only that objectivity which is bestowed by common 
thoughts of agreeing human minds~ 2 And yet, Kant maintains that 
the mind has its own source of constitutive principles of under-
standing, from which it has knowl~dge independently of experience.3 
Thus there is a two-sidedness to Kant's source of knowledge. It 
would seem inevitable that some of his interpreters should seize 
upon the sensory side, and overlook the rational side. This is the 
kind of interpretation which Otto criticizes. It would also seem 
1. Otto, POR,67. 
2. Smith, CCPR,l4. 
3. Smith, CCPH,lO. 
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inevitable that some of Kant's interpreters should seize upon 
the rational side, and overlook the sensory side. Otto indicates 
that Fries extends the rational side of Kant's system, although 
there is no indication that Fries overlooked the sensor.y side .. 
Otto considers this an improvement over Kant's work, and takes 
up again the criticism of reason in order to establish further 
principles of knowle dge . These extentions of criticism of reason, 
by Fries and by Otto, go far beyond what Kant would have allowed 
in his own Critique of P~re Reason. 
c. The Theory of Ahnung 
The epistemology of Rudolf Otto is 'enriched not only by the 
emphasis which Fries gave to the critical method and to the 
claimed correction of Kant's "fallacious inference", but also by 
the theory of Ahnung which he formulated. This word is ordinarily 
left untranslated. E. B. Dicker, translator of Otto's Philosophy 
of Heligion, gives this as his own rendering: "In its ordinary 
use it is 'the obscure prevision of some coming event, not based 
on clear grounds a.nd merely felt' .. "l He quotes from Eisler's 
Handworterbuch der Philosophie: 
Fries understands by Ahnung (Ahndung) a conviction, 
originating in the feelings, without any definite con~ 
ception, of the reality of the supra-sensual, which gives 
us a reflection of the real existence of things in their 
phenomena, and brings us to their eternal meaning and 
purposeful connection, in Nature's sublimity and beauty. 2 
l. Otto, FOR,ll. 
2. Otto, POR,ll. 
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Davidson quotes Fries himself on his use of t he term: 
We distinguish Wissen, Glauben and Ahnden as three dis-
tinct types of conviction entirely different from each 
other. e•• Wissen means only the convict i on of a complete 
knowledge, the objects of which -are known through per-
c~ption; Glauben, on the other hand, is the necessary 
conviction of ·pure reason, which can come to our 
consciousness only in concepts, that is, in ideas;1but Ahndun~ is a necessary conviction of pure feeling• 
Otto says of Fries' development of the theory: 
The source of Fries' doctrine of ahnung -- so far as it 
is not just the positive experience of the man himself --
is the Kantian Criticism of Judgment. • •• . At the very 
outset i n the tefl.ching of Fries, Philosophy's nobles t 
task is to discover the real nature o.f Belief, and the 
ideal s~here of Conviction, and to make their truth 
secure. . 
The precise meaning of such a term is not to be found in the 
adding or subtracting of qualifying or restricting words, simply 
because its meaning is not precise. Its meaning is vague~ cloudy 
and indistinct. Its use will seem strange and unreliable to those 
who require clear and distinct terms for their propositions. It 
may be that such .a. term accumulates meaning with use. Those like 
Fries and Otto who used it as a matter of course no doub t had a 
satisf'actory understanding of their meaning of it. It is easy to 
become impatient with them for using a term casually which to 
' others is still vague and requires much explanationw It is more 
profitable in some cases to allow the use of t erms on the basis of 
"extended credit" until those terms gain more meaning in general 
use. This term is basi c to the vocabulary of Otto, and its meaning 
1. Davidson, ROIR,l49. 
2. Otto, POR,23-24. 
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will become clear and understandable if he is allowed to use it 
in context with his whole philosophy. Otto's own use of the term 
' 
will be explicated in a later chapter .. 
The Neo-Friesian school, and Rudolf Otto especially, held 
to a certain attitude and methodology in philosophical endeavors~ 
The methodology espoused was that of Kant, which he called the 
critical method, and which was taken up and extended by Fries. 
The philosophy of Kant was followed in the broad outlines.. In 
important respects, however, corrections were offered to features 
of Kant's philosophy which were claimed to be in error.. Foremost 
among these was the inference which was imputed to Kant, of the 
ideality of the object of knowledge wherever such knowledge is 
seen to arise from a priori categories of the mind.. Fries claimed 
that this inference is not to be allowed, but that a consistent 
pursuit of the critical method will disclose internal evidence that 
the categories must have object i ve validity, that the forms in which 
the mind kn.ows its objects must rather correspond to reality and 
be obedient to it. A possible explanation of Kant's own position 
has been offered in a foregoing section~ The critical method also 
allows for an interpretation of the foundation of ideas. This 
group of interrelated features constitutes the major thesis of 
the Neo-Friesian school, of which Otto was a leader. Any under-
standing of his epistemology must take into account this part of 
his background. He is not responsible for all the opinions and 
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expressions of this group of philosophers, and he does not simply 
mirror the thought of otherse But he does work within the frame-
work of this group. His was a growing and expanding expression 
of thought and insight, and one which was oriented around the 
philosophies of Kant and Fries. 
IL THE AUFKLitRUNG, LUTHER AND SCHLEIERMACHER 
II 
The term Aufklarung is another of those German philosophical 
coins which is not readily convertible into the currency of other 
languages. Fortunately, it has been in general use in philosoph-
ical literature to such an extent that it is not completely for-
eign to any language. Windelband says the Philosophy of the 
Enlightenment coincides with the eighteenth century. He compares 
this movement to the Greek sophistic movement. 
There prevails in both the sB~e turning of thought towar d 
the subject's inner nature, the same turning away from 
metaphysical subtlety with doubt and disgust, the srune 
preference for an empirical genetic consideration of 
the human psychical life, the same inquiry as to the 
possibility and the limits of scientific knowledge, 
and the same passionate interest in the discussion of 
the problems of life and society.l 
Otto is conscious of a flow of ideas over the centuries, with 
each individual making contributions peculiar to himself yet 
common to the whole., fl The Aufklarung was for Otto a very vital 
movement, not all good or bad, but rather a vast arena of human 
activity where men spoke with a sense of responsibility and with 
1. Windelband, HOP,437-438. 
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respect for their hearers as rational persons. 
A. The Religious View of the Aufkl~rung 
Otto outlines a religious view which he imputes to Fries. 
He finds this view developing in the Aufkllirung, and in large 
measure indicates his own religious orientation. These are the 
principles of this view as they appeal to him: 
1.) Religious and ethical convictions, Religion and Ethics in 
general, cannot be 'accidental truths'. 1 In reaction to Scho-
lasticism, the philosophers of the AufklMrung developed the 
principle that the validity of religion could not rest finally 
upon the appeal to any authority, tradition, scriptures, historical 
event or anything outside the inner conscience of man. This 
principle is taken at face-value to be self-evidently true. 
This contrast between a concept of religious validity based on 
outward authority and a concept based on inner necessary truth 
is analogous to the contrast between the experience of being 
taught and that of learning for oneself. A concept which calls 
for inner convi ction is necessary to the very life of religion. 
This principle is self-evident to this view of religi on. 
2 .. ) "Religion must have its own sources and a separate life of 
its own 11 .. 2 Religion must not be made dependent upon logical 
deduction and academic speculation. The emergence of 11L~y­
Christianity" which accompanied the Renais.sance .was in active 
l. Otto, POR, 34 . 
2. Otto, POR,34. 
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revolt against the attitude of the Middle Ages that religious 
speculation is an expert's proprietary doma~n8 The common sense 
attitude of the Renaissance toward the need of individual conviction 
carried over into a feeling that indeed religion should be some-
thing that the individual, even though academically uninitiated, 
i f b T • II could become conv need o , on reasons le groundse he Aufklarung 
is generally noted for its tendency to "intellectualize" religion .. 
This is only one side of the coina The other side is the attempt 
to find a reasonable basis for belief as a refuge fr om the "hair-
splitting" of the expertse Locke was not concerned to do away 
with the suprarational in his Reasonableness of Christianity so 
much as he was to find a practical .statement of what had too long 
been of . theoretical importance only . Kant, toot sought basically 
to save the "average manu from the vagueness of Scholastic specu-
lations.1 The whole theme of Deism and the AufklMrung was the 
conviction that philosophy does not create new truth, but rather 
exhibits what has been latent i n the mind of man, even the 
"average man" all along.2 
II 
3 .. ) The Aufklarung still asked for proofs of' religious conviction .. 
Hence a new kind of' Scholasticism grew up on the ashes of the old. 
The reaction against rationalism i n religion was persistent, so 
the basis of this new system of' proofs was sought in feeling 
rather than in reflectiona Fries seeks to resolve this confusion 
1. Smith, CCPR,lviia 
2~ Otto, POR,35-36~ 
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by applying the critical method to the nature and function of 
religious feeling. It was Fries who brought philosophic light 
rather than prophetic revelation to the issue, laying a firm 
foundation to that "immediate actual knowledge, non-reflective, 
which has its life in feeling 11 • 1 
These characteristics of the view of religion which had. its 
It 
roots in the Aufklarung are also characteristic of Luther and 
Fries, and of Otto himself. AufklHrung was many things to 
many people, and what Otto got from it is not at all what some-
one else might have gotten from it. But he traces certain 
features of his own background into this historical movement. 
" That, is the important aspect of the Aufklarung for a study of 
Otto's epistemology. 
B. The Influence of Luther 
As a Lutheran minister and theologian, Otto was vitally 
interested in his church and its life. His first book was 
Luther's Interpretation of the Holy Spirit. His book of Religious 
Essays, written in 1 931, takes up concerns which he felt vital to 
his communion and to Protestantism as a whole. His study of .Luther 
led him to place the Reformer on a very high level among religious 
philosophers. It is this religious influence which is important 
to the development of Otto 's epistemology. 
Luther's principal contribution to the growth of the stream 
l. Otto, POR,37 . 
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of religious views which Otto follows is his insight into the 
reality of God's use of the world of sense for revelation of 
eternal truth. According to the older scholastic view, God is 
assumed to be part of the same world as that which is open to 
the sensesj only an invisible part.. Pushing back the frontiers 
of the unseen side of this dual world by the development of 
natural science reduces the arena of God's "unseen" domain. 
Finally, "the unseen is forced to take refuge in the cracks and 
joints in Nature's frame". 1 That which is seen is the ·image of 
that which is unseen. The derived second causes of Nature are 
actually a form of divine action. The working of God, i. e., the 
clue to His reality and Nature, is to be found in the ordinar y 
events of experience. 2 
The development of this insight into God 1 s use ·of. the 
visible world for revelation of the unseen world became the great 
task of 'l'ranscendental Ideal ism for Fries and Otto. Kant's 
method provides a philosophical basis for the value oi' feeling 
for knowledge, a metaphysical fqundation for the numinous quality 
in experience. 
C~ The Influence of Schleiermacher 
It would be peculiar if the epistemology of Rudolf Otto 
could be analy~ed without serious reference to F. D. E . Schlei-
ermacher~ So great was his influence upon German theological 
1. Otto, POR,37-43. 
2. Otto, POR,37-43. 
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thought that he has become something of a water-shed. Schlei-
ermacher sought to restore to German Protestantism something o£ 
its pietistic flavor·, to call the communion of faith back to 
devotion as a .fundamental ingredient of the Christian life. 'rhe 
excesses of some of the radical statements concerning 'feeling' 
in his early writings were largely overcome in his later works, 
so that the study of his writings has become almost as much an 
avocation of theologians as the study of Kant has of certain 
philosophers. The full range of Scbleiermacher's work is not 
important here. The feature of his philosophy with which any 
study of Otto must concern itself seriously is that which relates 
to the emotive side of religion; specifically to the value of 
feel i ng for knowledge. 
Schleiermacher reacted against the attitude that piety should 
consist either in knowing or in doing, or in both.. He admitted 
the i mportance of knowledge, and of activity, but insisted that 
"piety is a state i n which Ifu.owing, Feeling, and Doing are 
c omb i ned."l Ot t o is greatly concerned to maintain that religion 
is not exhausted by conceptual knowledge, as the subsequent chapters 
of this thesis will a t t empt to demonstrate. Schleiermacher charac-
terizes piety as "the consciou'sness of being absolutely dependent, 
or, which is the same thing, of being in relation wi th God .. "2 This 
feeling of absolute dependence arises out of self-consciousness. 
1. Schleiermacher, TCF,ll. 
2. Schleiermacher,· TOF,l2. 
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He holds that self-consciousness contains two distinguishable 
elements, the self-caused element and a non-self-caused element. 
The former expresses the existence of the subject for itself, the 
lat ter its "co-existence with an Other."l 
These elements correspond in temporal self-consciousness to 
the "Receptivity" and "Activity" of the subject. 'l'hose modes of 
self-consciousness which express a state of receptivity give rise 
to t he feeling of dependence. On the other hand, those modes which 
express a state of activity initiate a feeling of Freedom. The 
subject feels himself to be f r ee when he is able to act spontane-
ously and thus to determine himself, and also to determine that 
other with which he co-exists in self-consciousness. The subject 
further feels himself dependent when he is determined from outside 
himself, that is, when he feels that it is impossible that he should 
be as he is without the activity of the Other with which he co-
exists in self-consciousness.2 
This feeling of dependence is only relative, as it is felt 
in self-conscious association with other persons and with nature. 
It becomes a feeling of' absolute dependence, according to Schlei-
ermacher, n:ot on the basis of previous knowledge about God. 
Now our proposition is in no wise intended to dispute the 
existence of such an original knowledge, but simply to set 
it aside as something with which, in a system of Christian 
doctrine, we could never have any concern, because plainly 
enough it has nothing to do directly with piety. If, 
1. Schleiermacher, 'l'CF, 1.3. 
2. Schleiermacher, TCF,l5. 
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however, word and idea are always originally one, and 
the term 'God' therefore presupposes an idea, then we 
shall simply say that this idea, which is nothing more 
than the expression of the feeling of absolute dependence, 
is the most direct reflection upon it and the most origi-
nal idea with which we are here concerned, and is quite 
independent of that original knowledge (properly so 
called), and conditioned only by our feeling of absolute 
dependence.l 
Otto criticizes Schleie~macher on the grounds t~at his 
distinction of the religious emotion or 11feeling of absolute 
dependence" from other feelings of dependence is quantitative 
rather than qualitativea The religious feeling is only 'more 
so', and not definitely and distinctively different in essential 
quality from other feelings of dependence, according to Schlei-
ermacher's theory, but not according to Ottoa The religious 
emotion is better characterized as the feeling of a creature in 
the presence of his Creator, as Otto sees it. This is a complex 
feeling, and not simply that of dependence, which might arise 
merely from a sense of one's impotency in the face of a challeng-
ing situationa2 
Otto further criticizes Schleiermacher 1 s theory of Ahnung 
on the grounds that a feeling of absolute dependence tells more 
about the subject who feels than about the object which is felt. 
Otto contends that inasmuch as Schleiermacher places emphasis 
upon the sense of dependency which arises out of the religious 
experience, he tends to characterize the nature of the experient 
1. Schleiermacher, TCF,l7. 
2. Otto, IOH,lO. 
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more than he does to characterize the object of the experiencee 
Otto says in this connection: 
The religious category discovered by him, by whose means 
he professes to determine the real content of the religious 
emotion, is merely a category of self-valuation, in the 
sense of self-depreciatione .... Thus, according to 
Schleiermacher, I can only come upon the very fact of 
God as the result of an inference, that is, by reasoning 
t o a cause beyond myself to account for my 'feeling of 
dependence ' .1 
Otto holds with Schleiermacher, that the essence of religion is 
to be found on the level of feeling rather than on the level of 
inference, but he differs sharply from his predecessor as to the 
nature and value of that feeling. Otto doe.s not free himself 
from all use of inference, however, as subsequent chapters will 
a ttempt to demonstrate~ 
Briefly, Otto would have his own theory of the essent ial 
religious emotion described as "creature feelingn .. · This, he 
insists is not to be taken as a conceptual explanation, but rather 
as an indication of the emphasis upon the distinctive character 
of the feeling as a result of what the e.x:perient 11 feels 11 t o be 
the nature of the object of his experience. 
Al l that this new term, 'creature feeling', can express, is 
the note of self-abasement into nothingness before an over-
powering, absolute might of some kind; wherea.s everything 
turns upon the character of this overpowering might, a 
character which cannot be expressed verbally, and can only 
be suggested indirectly through the tone and content of a 
man's feeling-response to it-2 
While the first element of this 'creature feeling' is indeed 
le Otto, IOH,lO .. 
2. Otto, IOH,lO .. 
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subje ctive,. it "has immediate and primary reference to an object 
outside the self"~ 1 It is on the possibility of important cogni -
tive gains concerning the nature of God that Otto wishes to place 
his emphasis, rather than on the self-centeredness which he sees in 
Schleiermacher 's approach . 'l'his is an important point for Otto's 
epistemology, since he holds that a certain type of feeling per-
forms B. valuable cognitive function~ This 'Feeling for Truth' will 
be discussed at some length in a later chapter~ 
The philosophical and religious orientati on of Rudolf Otto 
is expecially important in view of the originality of certain 
features of his epistemology. These original features are apt 
to place him somewhat outside the main stream of Proteste.nt 
thought, at least on first notice. He has made some startling 
contributions to the religious vocabulary and has suggested some 
possible alternatives to the problem of religious knowledge which 
are unique in the history of Christian thought. An appreciation . 
of his background, elements of which have been suggested in this 
chapter , will indicate that he is indeed in the main stream of 
Pr otestant thought, and may prove t o be a major factor in the 
development of that stream in the f uture.. His was not a "root 
out of a dry ground", but rather a "tree planted by the rivers 
of wat er".. He lived in one of the great watershed times of human 
thought, and was conscious of the richness that came down to him 
from Luther, Schleiermacher, Kant, Fries and others~ 
l~ Otto, IOH,lO. 
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C HAPTI!:R TY'iO 
IW~EDIATE KNOWLEDGE OF REASON 
Rudolf Otto's major contr i bution in epistemology is in the 
area of the relation of faith to knowledge. He takes up those 
problems which have concerned theologians and philosophers since 
t he early days of first-century Christianity.. In some periods, 
the primacy of faith, with a prejudice against supposed misuse of 
reason and intellect, has been in the a.scendancy. In other periods, 
the claims of knowledge, with a prejudice against what was held 
to be obscurantism and incoherence, have been held to be primary. 
The pendulum swings between the extremities of its arc, and men 
also go from extremes of one position to those of an opposing one .. 
Ther e have been some, however, who succeed to some extent in 
introducing a new perspective i n to the running to and fro, and thus 
lift the whole pursuit to a new level of insight.. Otto may prove 
to be one of these men. 
I.. VALIDI'11Y OF REL.IGIOUS CONVICTION 
It was Otto's conviction that no criterion of validity of 
religious insight can be gained from a historic study of relig-
ions.. What will yield that cr i terion is a discovery and under-
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standing . of "an individual principle of truth residing in us, 
by which we measure ,and through which we decide. "1 This means 
that the work of Kant in the 11Criticism of Reason" must be 
carried into the field of religious ideas, not slavishly mimick-
ing Kant in his conclusions, but rather extending, correcting, 
and augmenting his achievementse 
In the criticism of Reason Otto seeks for a category of 
knowledge which will provide for the basis of religious ideas in 
somewhat the same way that the categories of Kant and others pro-
vide a basis for scientific, aesthetic, and other types of know-
ledge . Otto credits the discovery of categories of the under-
ste_nding, the forms under which the mind knows whatever it knows, 
to Kant82 The foundations of learning are laid upon the capacity 
of the mind to make judgment concerning the welter of data, 
internal and external, with which it is supplied in the complex 
situations of life. The discovery of this constitutive a priori 
element of Reason itself was Kant's basis for his whole system. 
Vfrlile Otto does not adopt Kant's system wholesale, he does base 
his own formulation of religious knowledge upon Kant's elementary 
discovery of a priori knowledge. 
Otto was among those who sought to establish an independent 
a priori cs.tegory of religious knowledge. Kant had sought to 
establish a basis for religious conviction in ethical conviction, 
1. Otto, POR,l6-
2. Otto, POR,l8. 
28 
but Otto regarded this as a fallacy~ He believed from the first 
that there must be an independent foundation for religious con-
viction, however closely that fou~dation may be allied with all 
other valid categories of knowledgeQ This belief he acknowledges 
in his early work, PhilosoEhY of Religion, although he does not 
yet achieve any satisfactory formulation of such a category in 
it~ 1 The mature formulation of his whole epistemology is to be 
found in the explication of that category in his magnum opus, 
The Idea of the Holy, which came some eight years after his earlier 
work. 2 
II. SOURCE OF KNOWLEDGE OF REASON 
One of the serious handicaps under which Kant and other 
philosophers of the Aufkl~rung labored is that which Otto calls 
the "assumed omnipotence and despotism of Proof. 11 3 The new 
' 
attitude of science had grown up in a reaction against unfounded 
opinion held as necessary Truth~ Yet the method of the new atti-
tude was as surely dogmatic as that of the old. The esrly pioneers 
of science, such as Newton, had only· the methods of experience 
and proof, and those could be used only after some ultimate princi-
ple or axiom had been assumed. By the methods then used, one might 
find workable and coherent hypotheses, but the results of all in-
vestigation so conducted would fail to establish any universal and 
l~ Otto, POR,l7. 
2. Otto, IOH,ll6. 
3.. Otto, P OR, 20 .. 
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necessary law. Hume's skepticism cut deeply into the roots of 
the problem, even if he himself had nothing better to offer~ 1 
The answer to the problem, as Otto sees it, is to be found 
in following Kant's method which goes behind experience to the 
nature and capacity of the experiencing mind: 
The solution of the problem lies in the criticism of 
reason and the ensuin·g demonstration and discovery of a 
fundamental and rational real knowledge, which it possesses, 
obscurely, independent of all experience, i. ee, a priori, 
of itself alone, as "pure reason", and in the demonstration 
that those first principles of natural science, that "pure 
knowledge of Nature", are based on pure reason.2 
It seems to be Otto's contention that the basis for under-
standing truth is to be found in Reason itself. In thie respect, 
he is more than thorough going as a rationaliste He also seems 
skeptical of any system of logical proof which does not take 
account of the unproveability of its first premises. He rejects 
the "dogmatism of proof" as he finds it in his predecessors. The 
knowledge which is derived in "pure intuition", as Kant might 
call it, is true knowledge because it is both universal and 
necessary, and as such is not particular and specific. 
While the "if" and "how" of the knowledge of the world are 
to be established in the mind itself, this is only a starting 
point. The knowledge of reason provides the conditions of time 
and space which make possible a scientific understanding of nature. 
This knowledge of reason is therefore constitutive in the Kantian 
l. Otto, POR,45. 
2. Otto, POR,45-46. 
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sense, but not specific$ It has the force of universality and 
necessity, but not a content of specific data. It telis nothing 
of specific times and places, but it does tell the conditions 
of temporality and spatiality under which all individual instances 
must exist .. 
III. IMMEDIATE KNOWLEDGE OF REASON 
A. The Meaning of Immediacy 
One of the recurring phrases in Otto's Philosophy of Religion 
is "immediate knowledge".. Otto's use of this phrase has a different 
connotation than those used in modern discussions of immediacy, 
as applied to perception or cognition of objects. It has to do 
with the intuition of concepts and the recognition of the capacity 
of the mind for ideas which are directly known in Reason itself, 
rather than the direct cognition of objects. It would seem that 
in this instance, Reason has the dual role of both knower and the 
known.. In another connection, Otto says "All the.t is known about 
an object is a form of knowledge, but not every form of knowledge 
need be a knowing about an object".l This is a restatement of a 
perennial dilema: how do I know myself? Otto does not divide the 
total mind into a knowing mind and .a known mind, but he leans very 
heavily upon the capacity of the mind to turn back upon itself and 
to gain reliable information about its own structure and function .. 
1. Otto, POR,24f .. 
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This reliability has the f orce Of "Self-evident Truth"~ It is 
simply not not open to question on any reasonable grounds.l This 
is a basic assumption for Otto~ Obviously, this is open to 
criticism. Otto's reasoning will become clearer when he discusses 
the nature of the categories. Many have found introspection to 
be an inviting garden built on quicksand~ Otto is guarded not on 
the reliability of introspection, but rather on the scope which 
he allows it .. 
The distinction which Otto makes between the immediate 
knowledge he speaks of and the innate ideas which Leibniz and 
others spoke about reinforces the cognitive value of Otto's own 
introspection.. He holds that Leibniz was on the threshold of the 
full insight which is to be found in immediate knowledge, but 
stopped shorte In turn the philosophers of the "Naturalistic" 
school of Otto's own day are said to hold that innate ideas are a 
sort of inherited memory. Both the earlier Leibnizian and the 
later Naturalistic theories are inadequatea Otto says that 
Leibniz was at first immature in this theory, but to some degree 
corrected that in his Nouveaux Essais.. The "Naturalists", how-
ever, persist in error. They hold that the mind is forced by an 
instinct, similar to impulses on the subrational level, to associ-
ate ideas in certain ways.. This, Otto holds, is not knowledge of 
ideas at all. .The mind attains knowledge for itself. It 
1. Otto, POR,53 .. 
32 
discriminates and selects among possible alternatives, both with 
and without outward reference in experience~ It is free to reject 
or to accept Truth, although it is not free to deny its reality, 
so long as it operates as a rational minde 
If Knowledge is to exist, then God himself can do no 
more than create beings, who are what he himself is: 
beings with pure reason, ie ee, beings capable not 
merely of right thoughts, but of an individual 
immediate perception of Truth~l 
As a reasoning being, therefore, man has a 'built-in' perceptor 
of Truthe 
Be Immediacy and Experience 
Immediate knowledge does not, however, stand alone in 
divorce from empirical experience, but rather is wedded to it~ 
Any notion of a sort of Knowledge which is somehow previously held, 
temporally prior to experience, is denied. The connotation of 
immediate is metaphysical, not temporal, i. ee, just prior to 
in order of sequence, and not spatial, ie ee, just next to in 
order of position~ Knowledge which is immediate and a priori is 
not independent of experience, but rather makes experience possible 
a~ intelligi~le experiencee 
Tha t is to say: not a single actual knowledge exists in 
the soul prior to and without experience~ But when 
· experience and knowledge begin through sensuous perception, 
s imultaneous with the latter and mingled with it, there 
is developed a Knowledge which does not originate in 
experience, but is present and coexistent, independent 
I. Otto, POR,598 
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of all experience, e. g., all mathematical knowledge. 1 
Reason is somewhat analogous to the tabula rasa, and when stimu-
lated by sense perception, it mingles with the 'givens' of sense 
its own 'given', which is not strictly of any exterior origin. 
This latter 'given' would seem to be an analogy for what Otto 
means by Reason. 
c. Deliverances of Immediate Knowledge of Reason 
The reliability of Immediate Knowledge is not restricted, 
but its scope is. The Mind knows itself, that i s, its own 
capacities and function in general, vague terms. No amount of 
int rospection would yield reliable answers to a problem arising 
from a bodily sickness. But diligent introspection would yield 
insight into the cause-effect relationships which underlie all 
bodily processes, thos e of sickness and of health as well. Spe-
cifically, Immediate Knowledge leads to t he Categories and to 
Ideas. More than this would open the way for all sorts of 
illogical and incoherent conclusions: less than this would leave 
experiences of all sorts unintelligible. 
1.) The Nature and Origin of the Categories 
The Categories, for Otto, are conceptions in which 
Reason, absolutely pure, absolutely a priori, and thus 
necessary and universal, gains actual knowledge of the 
first most general determinations of all that exists, 
of all that can be experienced.2 
1. Otto, POR,59-60. 
2. Otto, POR,48. 
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It is through organization in accordance with the Categories 
that the mind has knowledge of things, a knowledge which may be 
schematized as laws. This knowledge is "universal, necessary 
and incontestable • .. .. for· all human reason in general", 1 and gives 
relative ontological positions of the knower and the known. The 
precise division between ~ category and that category would be 
in the area of ontological speculation, or metaphysics • . Con-
sideration of the categories is vital to any understanding of 
Otto's epistemology, however, since his whole outlook upon the 
knowledge venture is conditioned by a particular conviction as 
to the ultimate structure of Reality .. 
A clue to Otto's conviction upon this subject may be seen 
in his insistence upon the objective validity of the Categories. 
He does not mean that the Categories are 'things'; he has already 
said that they are 'conceptions'. He does mean, however, that 
the Categories are not simply subjective .mental events; they have 
validity apart from any individual conception.. Kant's mistaken 
inference of ideality from a priority led him into his metaphysical 
agnosticism. He inferred that, because a priori knowledge is 
'given' in Reason, it must necessarily be valid only for subjective 
organization of experience. It could not hold good f or a world of 
"Being-in-itself" .. 2 This conclusion closed to Kant the possibility 
of a metaphysics in terms of knowledge. Only a phenomenal world, 
1. Otto; POR,48. 
2. Otto, POR,52. 
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which "affects" the senses can be framed by the categories of 
the mind. Behind this, in an ultimate sense, he can only postu-
late a noumenal world of things-in-themselves. Nothing can be 
known which does not "affect" the senses. Such a metaphysical 
void could never satisfy the religious thrust which shows through 
Otto's work. He breaks sharply with Kant at this point. 
It will be worthwhile to investigate Kant's own position in 
this connection. It seems that in his determination to accommo-
date both rationalism and empiricism in the same system, he was 
obliged to 'tie down' concepts of the understanding to sensory 
experience. He distinguishes between 'pure intuition' and 
'empirical intuition'. The f ormer refers to the rational, faculty, 
the latter to sensory impressions. Pure intuition belongs to the 
a priori function of reason, while empirical intuition belongs to 
the a posterori matter of appearance.1 Both types of intuition 
are necessary in the derivation of categories. Kant says in this 
connection : 
We realise that we are unable to define them £cat~gories · ,_and 
the principles derived from the~ even if we wished. For if 
we remove all those conditions of sensibility which mark 
them out as concepts of possible empirical employment, and 
view them as concepts of things in general and therefore of 
transcendental employment, all that we can then do with them 
is to regard the logical function in judgments (to which they 
give expression) as the condition of the possibility of the 
things in themselves, without in the least being able to show 
how they can have application to an object, that is, how in 
pure understanding, apar~ from sensibility, they can have 
meaning and objectivity~ 
1. Kant, KRV,65-66. 
2. Kant, KRV,26l. 
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Kant concludes that "the most the understa.nding can achieve 
a priori is to anticipate the form of a possible experience in 
general" .. 1 He assumes that "that which is not appearance cannot 
be an object of experience 11 ., 2 Otto will object to this assumption, 
but this is not the cogent argument at this point .. 
Kant holds that space is the name given to the relations in 
which objects are known outside us. Space is valid, in that the 
relations which we call "space" are universal and necessary to any 
and all appearances. Th is represents objective va.lidity for Kant .. 
Our exposition therefore establishes the reality, that is, 
the objective validity, of spa ce in respect of whatever can 
be presented to us outwardly as object, but also at the same 
time the ideality of space in respect of thi ngs when they are 
considered in themselves through reason, that is, without 
regard to the constitution of our sensibility. We assert, 
then, the empirical reality of space, as regards all possible 
outer experience; and yet at the ·same time we assert its 
transcendental ideality--in other words, that it is nothing 
at all, immediately we withdraw the above c ondition, namely, 
its limitation to possible exper ience, and so look upon it as 
something that underlies things in themselves.,3 . 
By combining the several elements of his exposition which 
have been mentioned above we come t o s ome rather startling con-
elusions .. The a priori concepts are the ordering principles of 
the mind, but the categories of the understanding apply only to 
objects of sensory impressions·.. Space is the order of the external 
world as understood in the inner sense .. But space is not a "form 
inhering in things in themselves as their intrinsic property". 4 
1. Kant, KRV,264. 
2. Kant, KRV,264 ., 
3 ., Kant, KRV,72., 
4. Kant, KRV,73-43, 
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Space ra.ther has empiric reality, in that every mind must think 
external objects under terms of spatiality. Space is not real 
in the sense that is independent of being thought by a particular 
mind .. (The metaphysical status of space is not here in ques t ion, 
only Kant ' s method of exposition of its ideality.) Space is known 
to be ideal, due to its a priori nature as a c.oncept of the pure 
understanding.. This procedure, if generalized. to include the other 
possible categories or concepts of the pure understanding, would 
render the j udgment tha t all objects of any knowledge would be 
ideal, precisely becaus e all knowledge must be understood accord-
ing to the a priori constitutive principles of the pure understand-
ing. Thi s conclusion brings Kant to say that : 
Objects in themselves are quite unknown to us, s.nd that 
what we call outer objects are nothing bu t mere repre-
sentations of ou r sensibility, the form of which is space~ 
The true correlate of' sensibility, the thing in itself, 
is not known, and cannot be known, through these repre-
sentations; and in experience no question is ever asked 
in regard to it .. l 
On this basis, Kant comes to his distinction between phenomena 
and noumena, and what is called by some his "metaphysical ag-
nosticismu .. 2 
Norman K .. Smith points out that Kant recognized only two 
al ternatives : 11either space as objective is known a posteriori, 
or being an a priori representation it is subjective in origin" .. 3 
1~ Kant, KRV,74 .. 
2e Kant , KRV,267-268 .. 
3. Smith, CCPR,ll3 .. 
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Smith calls attention a third possible alternative, which Kant 
did not recognize: "though our intuition of space is subjective 
in origin, space is itself an inherent property of things in 
themselves". 1 This third alternative takes into account what 
Smith considers one of the main propositions of the Enlighten-
ment : the independently real can be known by a priori thinking.2 
The conclusion of the ideality of space is not questioned, but 
what is questioned ls Kant's inference that it is ideal because it 
is a priori as opposed to a posteriori. Smith holds that this 
is not simply an oversight or an immature statement on Kant's 
part, but that Kant would have regarded this argumen~ by inference 
as independent and sufficient proof of the ideality of space to 
the last.3 
Another pungent argument against Kant's inference is seen 
in Otto's criticism regarding the category of Causality : 
'l'he inference from apriority to idee_li:ty does not hold 
good; it is based on a false s~pposition, ie e., that 
the causality of the object towards us is made a 
criterion of objective validity~ But this criterion 
is also in sense perception applicable in appearance · 
only; and at t his point Kant is forced to attribute 
reality to that category of Causali ty which he pre-
cisely holds to be ideal. And, above all, it is true 
that we must subsequently assume this causality in 
the being-affected (just because the a priori law of 
causation is objectively valid); but as to the truth 
of the sense-perception we can in no way appeal to it, 
for it affords!!!.!!.£ perception!!!, all to s.2 with the 
other. We cannot, therefore, consider its presence 
l. Smith, CCPR,ll3. 
2. Smith, CCPR,ll3,. 
3. Smith, CCPR,ll4. 
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or absence as a criterion of the knowledgee The fact 
that we really know something in our sense-perceptions, 
i. e., that we conceive it according to its being, is 
solely based on Reason's natural self-confidence that 
it is capable of truth and knowledge, a confidence 
tha t no skepticism can r eally shake. ··~ Those "self-
evident" truths ..... are valid for Reason, as laws of 
the object~ve world itself. In them Reason sees at 
once what really is thus or thus; it could orly re-
nounce this conviction by renouncing itself. 
Otto recognizes that certain such "self-evident" Truths need to 
be seen in the light .of the cosmological antinomies discovered 
by Kant. The distinction is well made between a world of 
appearance and a world of reality and necessity. But the dis-
tinct ion is not on the basis of knowable and unknowable.. Each 
is knowabl e in its own appropriate way. 'rhe categories provide 
inadequate, but valid conceptions, which are analogous to higher 
ideas.. These ideas are themselves comprehensible, and capable 
of being expressed albeit in a limited way. 
For Otto, the categories are conceptions of universal laws, 
which have their origin and basis in t he pure reason. 'rhey are 
evoked, but not produced, by experience. The categories are the 
most general, and consequently the most vague, kind of knowl edge .. 
The separate categori es are derived by re:flection upon the tot a.l 
cognitive content o:f experience. The categories are not wholly 
determined by any single experience , but are discovered mingled 
with all experience. This cognitive form is the way Reason 
organized the data of experience so as to know its world in an 
1. Otto, POR,52-53. 
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intelligible way,. These formal elements are a priori, of the 
Reason itself, but i ndicate a Reality to which they necessarily 
answer, wholly independent of the Reason,. The categories are 
descriptive of Reality, but are limited by the same limitations of 
which Reason finds upon its own knowledge of the world. The mind 
awaits another cognitive form which will open for it higher in-
sight into the world of Reality: the way of ideas. 
2.) The Origin and Nature of Ideas 
The resources of Reason are not exhausted when the categories 
have organized the world of sensation. Indeed, this is the first 
and lower step in the cognitive process. The mind knows immediately 
not only the laws by which things must be known, if they are to 
be known in experience at all, but it also has access to the ·very 
essences of things through ideas. This, too, is a deliverance 
of immediate knowledge of Reason~ 
Idea is the conception of something which absolutely trans-
cends all experience, which, moreover, cannot be applied to 
experience, like the pure concepts of the understanding 
(Categories); and at the same time a concept which we must 
make nece ssary for ourselves from pure reason. Fries shows 
why we must make such concepts necessary for ourselves, and 
demonstrates their objective validity by revealing their 
origin in the "immediate knowledge" of rea:;Jon itself. He 
goes on to show that, based on the immediate knowledge of 
reason, we construct for ourselves ideas through which we 
cognize the essence of things as opposed to our knowledge 
of them in time and space; that in them we possess an 
imperishable understanding of the essence of things them-
selves, compared with which their cognition in space and 
t i me which is limited and therefore terminates, i .. e., proves 
itself to be a knowledge which for us only holds good 
f or the appearance of things, and not for their essence. 
1,. Otto 7 POR,66-67. 
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Reason has, therefore, an immediate knowledge of ~ts own structure, 
the forms of the external world, and the essences of things which 
it knows in experience~ The question arises as to how Otto will 
attempt to bridge the gap between experience of objects and ideas 
of the essences of knowable entities& 
Otto calls attention to the separate realms of matter and 
spirit which are given in a "pure science of nature".. Nature, on 
the terms of this science, allows for immanent causes only. Only 
matter, which is cognized in time and space, is stable and sub-
stantial& The psychic element of man's nature, the spiritual 
unity of consciousness, does not seem to have any place in this 
11 science of nature ·u. And yet this "pure science nature 11 and 
"Rational Psychology" have ·their basis in B: single ground ~ the 
criticism of Reason. The two disciplines stand side by side, and 
while quite distinct and separate from each other, they yet 
follow from a single source: the immediate knowledge of reason. 
Neither is derived from the other, but both are derived from 
I . 
Reason itself.. The phenomena of space, time and motion are known 
through the "pure science of rlature 11 , and the date of the psychic, 
spiritual 11 Soul" are known through the laws of Psychic Anthro-
pology .. l 
Otto holds that: 
The nworld of Knowledge 11 is itself of such a nature that it 
"fits on to" the Idea in a certain respect, that it possesses 
1. Otto, POR,62-64. 
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' 
and provides ntransitions 11 to ideal knowledge in nBelief'".2 
He takes the knowledge of' external nature as a starting point, but 
:moves on to the knowledge of' the "Soul". The former is a knowledge 
of' time, space, matter and motion, the latter a knowledge of' 
spirit, consciousness, and essences.. The world of nature, as known 
in appearances 
is not a personal and peculiar product arising from our 
own subjectivity; it is the appearances of' things them-
selves, for us, but for us as knowing them under limi-
tations.l 
These limitations of sensory cognition take into account the 
subjective element in all experience, sensory and otherwise. The 
ideal knowledge which is derived from pure reason is likewise 
limited in that it "transcends all experience", and must be applied 
to the cognitive consciousness through the unifying principle of 
completeness inherent in Reason itself. Neither "Knowledge", as 
sensory cognition, nor "Belief'1, as ideal conviction, is alone 
sufficient.. 'rhe two arise from a common source, and are resolved 
into a homogeneous whole.2 
rr'hese limitations are recognized in the "Antinomy of Reason". 
This problem of seemingly insoluble contradictions in a rational 
explanation of the world as it is known has been the unwelcome 
companion of philosophers dovvn through the centuries. It is of' 
II particular interest to the philosophers of' the Auf'klarung. The 
l. Otto, POR,67. 
2.. Otto, POR, 64-66. 
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problems which arise in cosmology are not secondary issues~ rr 
flat contradictions of every state~ent of cosmic knowledge can 
be held on equally rational grounds, does this not make a farce 
of reason itself? If each side of a paradox is equally tenable, 
then neither can mean much at all~ 
Otto credits Kant with breaking the stalemate of the 
antinomies. The difficulty, according to Kant's analysis, is 
that each side of the antinomy is predicated or different things. 
One side refers to a world of appearance, known in forms of 
limited categories, as only the mind can know it. The other side 
refers to an unperceived, uncontestable world which lies securely 
beyond any limitations of experience, and thus can be conceived 
only in terms of what must be inferred logically. The only con-
clusion t o be dram1 from this analysis is that appearance is some-
how not a complete representation of Reality. But how incomplete 
is this representation? Is it a false front, a sham, a shadow with 
no substance? ' Or is it a partial representation of the true nature 
of the whole, a limited understanding of Reality, but an under-
standing nevertheless? Is the understanding to stop short at the 
very threshold of Reali ty, and make no venture beyond the phe-
nomenal world? This is Otto's answer, in part: 
the "appearance" of things is set for us in opposition 
to their true nature: not in the sense that it is only 
illusion and that nothing is really known in it. We 
certainly k~ow, and not merely our dreams, but things, 
and reality itself. Our knowledge is, however, not a 
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perfect and unlimited knowledge of things as they really 
are: we know in restricted form. 
This answer suggests something different from what Kant indicates 
is his own estimation of the limits of knowledge: 
For we are brought to the c onclusion that we can never tran- · 
scend the limits of possible experience, though that is 
precisely what this science is concerned, ~bove all else, to 
achieve. 'I'his situation yields, however, JUSt the very 
experiment by which, indirectly, we are enabled to prove 
the truth of this first estimate of' our a priori knowledge 
of reason, namely, that such knowledge has to do only with 
appearances, and must leave the thing in i tsel.f as indeed 
real per se, but not known by us. 
'I'hus it appears that Otto and Kant are at odds on the possibility 
of knowledge of that non-phenomenal world, which they agree is 
real, having independent and necessary existence. One source of 
difficulty between the two is in the extent which each gives to· 
possible cognitive experience. Kant limits the possibility of 
cognitive experience to that which is open to sensory response.3 
Ot to, on the other hand, holds that there is a type of cont-
templative experience which is non-sensory, and yet has possible 
value f or knowledge and that both are needed for a complete under-
standing. This contemplation is in the realm of ideas, whi ch will 
be taken up in the fol lowing chapter.4 
1. Otto, POR,76a 
2. Kant, KRV,24. 
3. Kant, YillV,266. 
4. Otto, POR,66. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
KNOW~EDGE IN IDEAS AND IN SENSE PERCEPTION 
I. COGNITIVE VAL,UE OF IDEAS 
In the previous chapter, the exposition of Otto's theory 
of the Immediate Knowledge of Reason indicated that he holds tha.t 
the cognitive faculty is not restricted to the organization of 
sense data under terms of the categories of the mind, but has 
access to the essences of things through ideas. Indeed, the 
categories themselves do not refer alone to sensory data, as 
Kant would have it, but have their ontological status independent-
ly of the sensory faculties. 1 The categories .are objectively 
valid not only in that they refer to some non-subjective being, 
but also in that they exist in the pure reason prior to any such 
sensory stimulus-response relationship .. 2 This does not mean that 
there is a previous knowledge of them, but rather that the catego- . 
ries are the basis of experience, and that the categories are 
ontologically independent of experience, being dependent only upon 
the pure intuition of the mind. The catego!•ies have reference to 
sense data, but also to the data of feeling. 3 
1~ Kant, KRV,260. 
2. Otto, POR,48. 
3. Otto, POR,37 .. 
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This data of feeling, a Feeling of Truth, as Otto calls it, 
will be dealt with more extensively at a later time~ It will be 
helpful to see, however, that Otto regards the obscure, vague, 
semi-conceptual data of feeling as a clue to the inadequacy of 
Kant's epistemological system~ There seems to be an undertone 
of conviction that there must be an answer to the demand of this 
Feeling of Truth for ·a place in creditable philosophy of religion~ 
It is understandable that a theologian should feel this way~ Many 
others have had similar convictions and unwillingness to surrender 
the primacy of faith. But Otto attempts to build the case for 
faith on the grounds of Pure Reason. This disposition to find an 
11anthropological proofu which will . provide a reasonable alternative 
to logical deduction from sense data affords an insight into Otto's 
procedure. 
Kant insisted that the presentation of a non-sensory object 
must remain problematic, since the only way that a valid obser-
vation can be distinguished from an illusion is by means of an 
objective reference to a being which excites a response in.some 
sense organ~l Otto, however, insists that there may be cognitive 
value in contemplative experience of objects which do not excite 
sensory response: 2 In each C8se, there is a claim f'or an empirical 
basis~ The distinction comes in the scope that is taken for 
experience as a whole. Is it possible to have experience which 
1. Kant, KRV,264. 
2. Otto, POR,43~ 
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is not provoked by an object which stimulates the senses, and 
which will give the mind a 'foothold in nature'? If experience 
is to be defined in terms of that which is 'out there', then it 
might well be held impossible ~ I f, on the other hand, experience 
is to be defined in terms of the mind's activity in response to 
stimulation according to i ts own capacity to respond, then the 
question of sensory or non-sensory objects of stimula.tion is not 
so important. Otto would hold that experience, according to wha.t-
ever definition, is not the final and single cognitive situation. 
It is the capacity of the mind for ideas which gives the Reason 
an augmentation to (sensory) experience.1 This capacity is exer-
ci s ed in a higher type of (non-sensory ) experience~ Both types of 
experience are valid so far as their objective reference is con-
cerned. Each may be genuinely cognitive. Sensory experience, how-
ever, can give only phenomenal knowledge, while non-sensory ex-
perience ca.n give noumenal knowledge,. 
Ae Restriction of the Categorie s i n Temporal Schematism 
Otto holds, with Kant, that the mind organi ze s sens ory 
experience according to its own intuitive principles (Categories), 
and that the constituted knowledge w.hich results is the basis of 
the scientific understanding of the phenomenal world. The 
categories simply provide for an understanding of wha t is ob-
served, insofar as it is observable. Prior to observation, the 
1 . Otto, POR,66. 
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categorie s afford no knowledge of reality, but simply me.ke it 
possible to understand what the necessary and universal conditions 
of reality must bea The mind holds nature in a way which only a 
mind can hold it, and only in that way. If the categories are 
ontologically real, as Otto seems to indicate by his use of his 
term 'objective validity', then t he pure categories will indicate 
something which the schematized or restricted categories do not. 
The categories as conceived as pure principles give no indication 
of particulars, but only of the most general conditions of know-
ledge. Wnen experience is organized in understanding, the mind 
has made use of one or more of these pure categories, and thus 
restricted its generality.. Thus the category of' Cause, in pure, 
a priori f'orm, is simply the principle of' understanding by which 
a thing is said to be the r eas on for the existence of another 
thing.. But as some particular existent is said to be the cause 
of' another particular existent, the category is schematized, · or 
r estricted.. In this restricted form, the category of cause is 
the basis of the understanding of' change, which involves the 
necesslty of a temporal span of some duration.. In the prior part 
of this temporal span, one existent is present; in the latter part, 
another is present. The two distinguishable existents are not 
temporally co-existent.. The prior is the cause of the latter, and 
in turn the latter is the cause of' an effect in a different tempo-
ral span.. This cause-effect relationship is fundamental to the 
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sci.entific understanding of the world.. No 'free causes' can be 
tolerated, since each cause must also be an effect of a. prior, 
if unobserved, cause.. It is obvious to Otto that the 'narrowing 
down' of the categorles introduces a consideration foreign to the 
categories in their pure, unrestricted form. This narrowing dovm 
is the very essence of scientific progress, for abstract principles 
as such are of no use in the determi nation of concrete solutions. 
These principles are assumed in the beginning, as the basis of 
understanding, but they must be particularized, or they might as 
well not be recognized at all. All scientific knowledge is based 
upon schematized categories, not the pure, a priori categories.1 
It is little wonder if the scientific knowledge of the world 
affords little understanding of free causes, immaterial psychic 
being and finds the naturalistic explanations of cosmology most 
compatible with its observations . Otto regarded these natural-
istic explanations to be implicit in the 'pure science of nature' 
which has its basis in a law-abiding universe. These laws are 
necessary and universal conditions of understanding nature, but 
the universe which is thus conceived must be k~pt bigger than the 
laws, or the whole effort to replace dogmatism with open reason 
will be lost. The categories of the understanding do not define 
the limits of the mind's capacity to know, but simply indicate the 
avenue which the mind follows in its attempt to know. Thus the 
1. Otto, POR,57. 
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category of cause does not exclude an uncaused cause, nor an 
unobs er v able being~ But the cat egories do indicate how the mind 
might go about understanding anything which is the reason for the 
existence of another thing, and also how the mind might come to 
know any real being, observable or not ~ 1 
B. Amplification of the Categories in Ideal Schematization 
The observations of sensory perception which are organi zed 
a s t he scientific knowledge of the world are known not only in 
te rms of matter and mathematics, but also in terms of qualit i es 
which are peculiar to the mind itself~ Otto holds that this 
mental side of sense data is an indi c ation of the cognitiv e value 
of i d e as. The mind does not recognize frequencies of sound; it 
hear s t ones and harmoniesa Nor does the mind sense temperatur s ; 
it feel s heat and cold. It knows its environment in concepts, n ot 
in measurements and substances8 Thus for Otto the mind's knowledge 
of phenomena is not simply data about things, but rather thoughts 
ab out the environment of a unifying Egoe These thought s involve 
r elati on s and purposes which are the peculiar contribut i on of the 
knowing Ego. The Ego not only organizes sense data according to 
the cons t itutive principles of the categories, but it also brings 
its own knowledge into a homogeneous unity~2 
As i t was indicated in the previous chapter, Otto held that 
ideas g ive knowledge of the essences of t hin gs, whereas perception 
l . Otto, POR,62. 
2 . Ot to, POR,64. 
of' things in time s.nd space gives only knowledge of appearances •1 
He finds the justification for this claim not on the grounds of 
a redefining of sense perception, but rather on a re-establish-
ment of the whole cognitive process. u~hile Kant founded his 
concept of' the categories and i deas on Pure Reason, he also 
founded his concept of the mind's intake of data for knowledge 
upon the deliverances of sensory perception. Otto joins him so 
far as the foundation of the categories and ideas in Pure Reason 
is concerned, but not with respect to the mind's intake of data 
for knowledge~ Otto holds that cognitive experience is not to be 
defined in terms of the observability of an object, but rather 
upon the act i vity of the mind in response to a source of stimu-
lation. He does not call ideas 'cognitive experiences', but the 
phrase might well apply t o what he means by ideas, as well as to 
other mental experiences, sensory a n d non-sensory. 
It is not an experience, strictly speaking, which is cogni-
tive, but it rather is an Ego which cognizes, where objects of 
sense are present, and where no such object is present~ The Ego 
has access to knowledge of the appearance of things through sense 
experiences, and to knowledge of the essences of things through 
its own ideas of them. These ideas are not simply principles or 
self-imposed limits of the knowledge of things which is gotten in 
sense perception. These ideas are constructed upon the basis of 
1 * Otto, P OR, 6 7 .. 
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the Immediate Knowledge of Pure Reason "according to the principle 
1 
of completeness".. The question remains as to what the se ideas 
of Pure Reason may refer: to objects of sensory perception, to . 
objects not subject to sensory perception, or to a .way of knowing 
such objects, both sensory and non-sensory. 
If the ideas of pure reason are to be cognitive, what do they 
cognize? Do ideas point out the characteristics of obje~ts, or do 
ideas rather indicate the meaning of those cha.racteristics? Otto's 
answer seems to be in the area of meanin g rather than character-
istics~ It is the essence rather than the appearance which is 
cogni zed through ideas. But what of this essence? Is a particular 
object somehow seen-through to its core of being, and its meta-
physical essence exposed to ideal cognition? In one sense, this 
is so, in another, it is not~ 
The ideas of pure reason, like the categories, are most 
general and non-particularized. No idea could lead to the answer 
to a mathematical problem, but an idea will yield the possibility 
of finding and understanding such an answer. The ideas of pure 
reason are but a few, but have application to all that Reality 
may be ~ The idea of unity, for instance, according to Otto, indi-
cate s an aspect of the essence of any particular being: 
It Lthe idea of Uniti7 implies that each and everything in 
general is a synthetic unity, i .. e., constitutes a whole, 
in the complete connection of its elements, a coherent 
1. Otto, POR,81 .. 
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world of Being and Happening. • •• fJ:'his association is 
founded upon the Categories, especially the purely 
"Metaphysical 11 categories: Substance, Causality, and 
Reciprocal Act ion. These are nothing more nor less 
than the "Dimensions 11 , the various modes ·of Reason's 
fundamental conception as to the complete synthetic 
unity of Being itself~l 
The idea of Necessity is another aspect of the same general essence 
of Reality. The compounded idea is necessary synthetic unity, as 
Otto cal1s it. 
From tins necessary unity conceived as really perfected, 
in combination with belief in the reality of things, there 
immediately results, as supreme law of the essence of things, 
11 the principle of completeness".. . • • • Real Existence can 
onl y be conceived in completed totality of that which is. 
{Necessary synthetic unity, expressed differently.)2 
The cognitive value of ideas consists in this "supreme law for 
the essence of things 11 , rather than in specific characteristics 
of the essences of particular entities. If any Reality is to be 
known rationally, it must be known to exist according to this 
law. This is the import of the incompleteness of understanding of 
Reality in spatio-temporal terms, as pointed out on page 44 of 
this thesis. 
This "supreme law for the essence of things", synthetic 
necessary unity, suggests what· is otherwise known as the coherence 
theory of truth~ Otto does not use this terminology exactly, al-
though he suggests lus basic reliance upon the coherence principle 
by his stress on the "principle of completion" as noted above.. It 
1. Otto, POR,78 . 
2. Otto, POR,79-80. 
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would be quite natural for a Kantian such as Otto, inasmuch as 
Kant is called the 11real founder of the Coherence theory of truth" 
by Norman Kemp Smith .. 1 Smith epitomizes one of the characteristics 
of Kant's thought, which is carried forward by Otto, in the :propo-
sition "Nothing can be known save in terms of the wider whole to 
which it belongs .. "2 The similarity of Otto's "principle of com-
pleteness11 to Hegel's "System of Reality" is apparent .. 3 That Otto 
would neglect to appeal to Hegel as a philosophical precedent is 
understandable in the light of his expressed incompatibility with 
Hegel. 4 
Otto holds that the foundation of ideas is "laid in reason's 
immediate and fundamental knowledge of the necessary synthetic 
unity in the essence of things, a knowledge in itself obscure and 
deeply hidden~ "5 rrh is knowledge is not gotten from observation of 
the n a tural phenomena of the world.. It is rather a primary datum 
of the rational cons ciousness itself.. Far from being a self-
imposed del u sion, this 'immediate knowledge' is a conviction in 
every individual reason. 6 The ~'synthetic necessary unity in the 
essence of things" of which Otto speaks is a basic thought of 
reason. A mature intellect intuitively grasps this real essence 
of the manifold in which all perceptual experience occurs .. 7 The 
1. Srrdth, CCPR,36~ 
2.. Smith, CCPR,37; also Otto, POR,80 .. 
3. Windelband, HOP,615 .. 
4.. Otto, POR,l5,99,lOO .. 
5 • Otto, P OR , 81 • 
6~ Otto, POR,77 .. 
7. Otto, POR,79. 
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basis of ideas, then, is to be found in the pure, a priori reason 
itself, ontologically independent of all experience. 
What then would be the purpose of ideas such as Otto holds 
forth? 
They are to express the view of the Universe, which, as 
opposed to the inadequate view afforded by time and space, 
expresses the essence . of things, riot as presented to sensu-
ous perception in space and time, but as conceived by 
reason pure and simple, i~ e., according to the "principle 
of completeness". Now our knowledge of the essence of 
things was generally expressed in the Categories, and our 
sensuous perception of the world assumed shape as the 
categories were schematized through space and time. Thus 
we arrive at a purely rational view of the universe, if, 
instead of spatio-temporal schematism, we apply to the 
categories 11 idealn schematism, i .. e., if we conceive them 
without restriction and as following the principle of 
completenes.s .,1 
The schema tism of the categories, which gives the possibility of 
preci se knowledge of particular things, has been viewed as an 
empirical process entirely under Kant ·t s formulation .-2 Otto. here 
introduces a · process of 11 ideal 11 , or purely rational schema.tism 
as an alternative. The former process involves the view of the 
world as observed in perception and known in scientific knowledge 
of matter and mathematics only; the latter process involves the 
view of the world as comprehended by reason and known according 
to the capacity of reason itself. Ideal schematism provides for 
the building of concepts of Reality from primitive, vague "f·eelings 
for truth" tbrough a maturing, purifying process until full and 
reasoned concepts are achieved., These rational, full-grown concepts 
1.. Otto, POR,Bl .. 
2. Kant, KRV,l85 .. 
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are an expression of the same total truth as the primitive, vague 
semi-concepts. 1'he mind is finding the iullness of truth according 
t o its oVin capacity to understand it. Thus in the ideal scheme of 
t hings, the mind is not limited to the d~liverances of sense per-
ception, and to the knowledge of the phenomenal nature of the world, 
bu t is able to comprehend the real essential nature of the world in 
its deepe s t meanings,' due . to its own capacity to find its place in 
Reality. 
The only way in which such a procedure as Otto uses here can 
be saved from a ridiculous circularity, i. e., "the mind knows 
that it knows because it knows itself", is on the metaphysical 
basis that the mind of man is at home in the universe. This is a 
basic assumption for Otto.l The universe and reason are compatible, 
and not only that, but indeed each mirrors the other, each answers 
to a single Cause and Source. It is just such a metaphysics which 
Otto expounds in an ideal schematism of the categories: the im-
mediate knowledge of reason indicates "the operation of one unified, 
2 
essential, necessary, extramundane Cause of All in general ." "It 
is reason, and nothingbut reason, that postulates the absolutely 
•transcendent' cause, that exists above and beyond· the universe". 3 
The knowledge of Reality which comes through ideas gives an 
indication of the primitive semi-concepts whi ch underlie at an 
earlier stage of development the matlire understanding. The 
1 . See pages 33 and 40 above. 
2 . Otto, POR,Sl. 
3 . Otto, POR,89. 
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critical discovery of this primitive stage moves by way of re-
flection and mediate cognition. While it takes on a certain form 
of proof~ it nevertheless is simply the demonstration of how the 
mind knows what it already lmows . This demonstration is not based 
upon induction of a principle through the recognition of common 
characteristics in a series of observations. It is based upon a 
procedure of Deduction, which although it has a form of proof, is 
really. nno more than reflection with discussion" •1 The knowledge 
of Reality which the mind has through Ideas, is however, still a 
conceptual kind of knowledge. It merely hints at the primitive 
semi-conceptual kind of knowledge which is so distinctive a part 
of Otto's epistemology. This knowledge by the nFeeling for Truth" 
will be considered in the following section, along with Otto's 
thought on knowledge through sense perception .. 
II. KNOWLEDGE IN PERCEPTION M~D IN FEEkiNG 
Otto has less originality in his theory of sense perception 
than he has in his theory of feeling, so it may be wel l to look 
into the former theory first, and then to deal more at length 
with the latter.. Indeed, if only Ot to's theory of sense per-
ception were involved, he would have little to commend him to 
study as an original contributor. It is important to find where 
he stands with respect to some of the more common epistemological 
l. Otto, POR,94. 
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questions . 
A. The Creativity of Consciousness in Sense Experience 
Otto deals with the problems of consciousness and the 
possibility of knowledge through sense experience in his early 
book, Naturalism and Religion (1904). In this book he is refuting 
the claims which were currently enjoying some measure of popu-
larity in Germany and elsewhere in which consciousness was supposed 
to be a function of the physical body. He allies himself with the 
advances which had been made in psycho~physical theory, but insists 
upon the independence of consciousness, in opposi t ion to certain 
naturalistic psychologists of his day. He holds that consciov.sness 
is underivable from matter and energy, that its function is not 
comparable wi th that of the physical b ody.. The consciousness is 
\ 
associated with the body in some inexplicable way, and depends 
upon the b ody for those physical processes which g ive rise to 
sensation. This associat ion is obedient to law, even though this 
law is not subject to explication.l 
'otto holds further that sensory perception is essentially a 
change in the consciousness. 
What is a body, extension, movement, colour, smell and 
taste? What do I possess of them, or know of them, except 
through the images, sensations and feelings which they call 
up in my receptive mind ? .... I have no knowledge of an 
appletree or of an a pple, except through the sense per-
ceptions they call up in me. But these sense perceptions, 
what are they but different peculiar states of my conscious-
1 . Otto, NAH,299 . 
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ness, peculair determinations of my mind?1 
The mind, then is the center of perception, and not the object 
which excites a response in the mind. The mind perceives what-
ever it perceives according to its own inner capacity and structure .. 
Otto follows Kant here in the Copernican Revolution t hat Kant 
wrought in ph ilosophy : the conception that the mind knows the 
world of percept ion according to the s tructure of the mind ra.ther 
than a.ccording to the str•ucture of the world .. 2 Otto holds t hat 
the mind is creat ive in the cognitive process, that i s~ the mind 
thinks thoughts and conceptions, rather than objects and essences 
in the perceptive act. The world of knowledge is a world of 
consciousness itself. That which is outside is not •taken into 
t he mind', but is rather thought as only the mind can conceive it, 
and as it could never be without the creativity of .the mind. 
Otto relates this creative activity of the mind more closely 
to the faculty of reason in his Philosophy of Religion. 
Reason's total life and activity only begin, and only be-
come actual, in response to the stimulus given in the 
sense-perception. And without such a preceding sttmulus 
reason has neither idea, nor effort, nor action; it is, 
in f act, only tabula rasa. But if the stimulus comes, 
then appear together with the characters written by 
sensuous perception, mingled with them, other characters 
which are not given by sensuous perception, and could 
not be so given.3 
It seems that Otto is here making a distinction between the act 
of perception, which involves a creative act of consciousness in 
1.. Otto, NAR,303. 
2. Kant, KRV,22. 
3. Otto, POR ,60. 
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response to an outward stimulus,-. and another cognitive activity.-
which intuitively and reflectivel y abstracts from the acts of 
perception elements which it builds into ideas and conceptions. 
These two activities are both cognitive, although not necessarily 
equally so. The cognitive value of sense perception is seen in 
relation t o the creativity of consciousness which makes mental 
events ' out of outward events. The cognitive value of intuitive 
reflection is seen in relation to the reason's own capacity to 
understand the necessary and universal conditions to which all 
Reality must correspond . The sense perception is understood on 
the basis of the schematization of the categor.ies in time and 
space; the intui t:i.ve understanding is based upon the ideal schema-
tization of the categories . Thus the creativity of the mind is · 
not limited to the transformation of outward stimuli into mental 
events, but extends as well to the application of the necessary 
conditions of Reality to the knowledge of the stimuli of mental 
activity. The mind does not 'behold the essence' of an object of 
sensory perception in th act of perception.. Its knowledge of 
essences arises from a distinct rational activity, stimulated by 
sense perception, but by no means limited by such perception. 
B¥ Knowledge in Feeling 
The term "feeling" pervades the major works of Rudolf Otto. 
It appears frequently, and in crucial si t uations . It is very 
important that its meaning and use be understood. It is not a 
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distinctly religious term. Religious feeling is important to 
Otto's work, but this is a special useage. Emotion on various 
levels and toward various centers of attention has a large part 
in Otto's philosophy. But the term "feeling" is primarily used 
to indicate awareness, which may be vague and semi-conceptual or 
specific and highly descriptive of the object of awareness. '''hile 
basically psychological, the term takes on cognitive connotations 
for Otto. The whole psyche is in,Tol ved in feeling, but Reason has 
its use for the peculiar apprehensions of feeling. These appre-
. hensions may be only faintly cognitive, .or they may be highly 
cognitive.. Reason can use them for its purposes of comprehending 
its environment, and relating itself to that comprehension~ 
Otto speaks frequently of the "Feeling of Truth".. In one 
instance he says this: 
But the condition in which immediate Knowledge shows itself 
as active, even before light has penetrated to its primal 
obscurity, is the Feeling of Truth. In this feeling of truth 
we possess obscure and drep experience which compel us to 
recognize them as valid. 
Otto's implication is that this "Feeling of Truthu is a primary 
stage in the evolution of awareness. That is, awareness in feeling 
begins before the defining concepts which make up ordinary vocabu-
lary have developed sufficiently to afford expression of this 
awareness. The mind somehow gains progressively in its grasp of 
its environment, and throughout this progression, the awareness 
1. Otto, POR,59 
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is illuminated by the expanding powers of conceptuali zation., 
The awareness is of the principles to which Reality corresponds. 
The "obscure and deep experiences" are not specifically called 
sense perceptions, but there is more implied here than could be 
predicated of sense perception alone. These experiences are to 
some extent cognitive over and above the reception of stimuli by 
outward objects. The mi nd finds in experiences of the feeling of 
truth a necessity to attach the judgment of validity to the 
principles which inhere in those experiences. These experiences 
may not be clear, and may not give conscious expression to their 
importance. This, Otto regards as the task of philosophye 
For Otto's epistemology, there are three modes of cognition: 
feeling, sensing, and conceiving. Feeling has to do with the 
primary apprehension of vague qualities of Reality in a simple 
awareness. It is a 11form of cognizance in an uii.conceptional or 
preconceptional way. ttl Sensing has to do with .the changes in the 
states of consciousness which result from stimulation by outwar d 
objects .2 Conceiving has to do with the building up of ideas in 
the pure reason to relate that which is felt and sensed to the 
completely rational understanding of Reali ty .. 3 . These three modes 
of cognition are present in the . mind's maturing grasp of the 
Universe, perhaps not equally at every discoverable stage, but at 
1. Otto, POR, Author's Notes on the Translation, addenda to p. 24. 
2. Otto, NAR,303. 
3~ Otto, POR,Sl. 
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least in a unified way. It is the Ego-consciousness which knows, 
not Reason or sense or feeling~ 
Otto's "supreme law for the essence of things", his final 
court of appeal, is the conviction that uReal Existence can only 
be conceived in completed totality of that which is". 1 All feeling, 
sensing and conceiving must obey this law, and each must in turn 
make its own contribution t o the understanding of completed to-
tality. It is not justifiable to limit the understanding of Nature 
to the organization of sensory data through the concepts of the 
categories, in view of the additional concepts available to the 
Understanding based upon pure Reason. Understanding or Nature must 
be open to the ultimate nature of Reality in its essence, and to 
its groundedness in "effective and independent Being 11 • 2 
Otto speaks also of feeling as an awareness of the true 
spiritual nature of the universe in experience of the sublime and 
the beautiful. 3 This feeling cannot be resolved into a conception, 
but must remain vague, however pervasively it may be felt. It 
follows in the experience of the world of nature, when that world 
id understood as being the instrument of the revelation of the 
True world of Reality, that the beauty of the world of nature takes 
on a greater degree of meaning and importance than it ever could 
if it were understood a.s standing alone . In this feeling of the 
1.. Otto, POR, 80t-8l. 
2 - Otto, POR,89. 
3~ Otto, POR,94~ 
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beauty of .the world as revelation of the nature of Reality the 
mind has a first step toward the appreciation of the mystery of 
of Religion. The spiritually beautiful and sublime is equally an 
instrument of the revelation of the nature of the Reality within 
Religion.. There is an element of mystery in Religion. Indeed, 
Otto says that "Religion itself is an experience of mystery .. "1 
The apprehension of this mysterious element in Religion is in the 
area of feeling~ The whole subject of religious knowledge will 
be taken up in the following chapter. 
1. Otto, POR,93 ,. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE HOLY 
I~ THE NATURE OF RELIGIOUS KNOVlliEDGE 
In the opening pages of The Idea of the Holy, Otto draws 
the distinction between conceptual and non-conceptual elements 
in religious knowledge. The conceptual element is necessary for 
any rational religion~ The concepts which characterize the 
Christian attributes of Deity are Spirit, Reason, Purpose, Good 
Will, Supreme Power, Unity and Selfhood.. These concepts are such 
_as can be grasped by the intellect, and admit of rational defi-
nition .. Only on such terms can Chr istianity retain an objective 
and communicable content of faith~ 
Rather we count this the very mark and criterion of a 
religion's high rank and superior value--that it should 
have no lack of conceptions about God; that it should 
admit knowledge--the knowledge that comes by faith--of 
the transcendent in terms of conceptual thought, whether 
those already mentioned or others which · continue and 
develop them.l . 
The tendency of rational religion is to expound its concepts 
and to convey its ideas in the clearest and most precise language 
possible . This brings about an erroneous view that the truths 
of religion can adequately be unders tood in conceptual terms. 
1., Otto, IOH,l .. 
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This error is compounded .by the tendency toward the use of 
religious terms as though they were themselves both subject and 
predicate at once~ While the ~onceptual attributes are rightly 
considered 11essential" rather than "accidental", they are yet 
but the predicates of a sub ject which they qualify, but by no 
meM1s exhaust ively describee The subject of which these con-
ceptual attributes are predicated requires a different kind of' 
comprehension than concepts can afforde The mystics have called 
' ) I this deeper, essential comprehension of God 1 s nature j o a ,__ tj-;' '1 /, 
I I . 
the ineffablee But these same mystics have been eager, in most 
cases, to indicate just what this inef'fability mes.nt to them .. 
This distinction between the conceptual and non-conceptual 
elements of religious knowledge is seen by Otto in connection 
with what he calls "the contras t betwee.n Rationalism and pro-
founder religion~. 1 This contrast is not properly seen, accordi ng 
to Otto, on the basis of acceptance or rejection of the possibility 
of the miraculous. The Rationalists have even framed theories, 
in some cases, which would explain the untheoretical. 
The difference between Rationalism and its opposite is to 
be found elsewhere~ It resolves itself' rather into a 
peculiar dif'f'erence of' quality in the mental attitude and 
emotional content of the religious lif'e itself'. All depends 
upon this: in our, idea of God is the non-rational overborne, 
even perhaps wholly excluded, by the rational? Or con-
ver~ely, does the non-rational preponderate over the ration-
al'? 
The dogmatizing tendency of' every orthodoxy, that effort to set 
I. Otto, IOH, 3. 
2. Otto, IOH,3 .. 
67 
clear and distinct standards of' thought which is so characteristic 
of the cooling-off periods of' every religious movement has the 
natural effect of emphasizing the rational element, since that is 
precisely the element that lends itself to conformity. Otto 
observes that: 
So far from keeping the non-rational element in religion 
alive in the heart of the religious experience, orthodox 
Christianity manifestly failed to recognize its value, 
and by t his failure gave to the ldea of' God a one-sidedly 
intellectualist and rationalistic interpretation.l 
It seems that what Otto means by Rationalism in Christianity is 
not necessarily distinctive because it accepts the principle of 
or der and intelligibility in the faith and practice of the Church. 
This, according to Otto, might be said affirmatively of some n on-
Rationalists, if Otto places himself' in this group, as he seems to~ 
The distinction might well be drawn upon the basis of attitude 
toward the possibility of finding definitive solutions to whatever 
problems arise in religion. According to Otto's portrayal, the 
Rationalist would assume that the solutions to problems or questions 
would naturally be framed like those which might arise in any other 
area, in conceptual terms . Otto, as a religious non-Rationalist 
(one who adheres to the rrprofounder religion" which he contrasts 
with Rationalism), would assume just the opposite, that the so-
lution to any problem, the understanding of any experience or 
situation, might well be outside the limits of any conceptual terms ~ 
1~ Otto, IOH,3. 
68 
I ndeed, the full understa.nding of any religious experience would 
involve. an appreciation of the non-conceptual element. The non-
Rationalist, such as Otto, does not simply rest in the possibility 
of ineffability as a substitute -for intellectual discipline. He 
does~ however, accept religion on its own terms, and re c ognize 
this peculiar aspect of religious knowledge: That it is, because 
of its feeling content, something that is to be evoked rather than 
learned and taught. 
It would seem strange to have to call Otto an anti-Rationalist, 
after he has made an analysis of reason the basis for his theories 
of Immediate Knowledge, Transcendent Idealism, and his extention of 
Kantian Rationalism~ He would seem to be most likely to be called 
a Rationalist, whether his conclusions were to be approved or not~ 
The fact remains, however, that in the clear language he uses to 
set off ttthe contrast between Rationalism and profounder religion", 
he is aligning himself with the 11 profounder r eligion", and setting 
himself ' apart from what he calls Ratio.nalism. 
As to his own position, Otto says, "On no account do I wish 
to be considered a. 1non-rationalist'". 1 He gives an account of his 
position in regard to the rational and non-rational factors in 
religion in The Author's Notes on the Translation found in the 1931 
English edition of his Philosophy of Religion.. He says at this 
point, a.fter both his Philosophy of Religion and The Idea of the 
1. Otto, POR, Author's Notes on the Translation, note no. 4. 
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Holy had been in circulation many years: 
I had begun to give expression to my · ideas on the non-
rational factor in Religion; these were afterwards 
developed in my book, The Idea of the Holy • . In . The 
Philosoph~ of Rel i gion I wished to present the . 
ttrational factor in Religion, which, for me, is no 
less important and es sential than the non-rational.l 
This will confirm the importance of a broad approach to Otto's 
philosophy, which has been at tempted in this thesis. 
Philosophically, Otto clearly enough held to the superiority 
of reason itself as a source of knowledge of Reality over any other 
source. Theologically, however, he did not hold that reasons could 
be given as explanation for all that religious intuition and ex-
perience might present as knowledge,. If a Rationalist discovers a 
unique element in religion which does not yield itself to intel-
lectualization, should he accept it as such, and go ahead with 
his analys is, or should he refuse to allow such a defiance of 
i ntel l ect ualization, and rule out whatever he cannot explain in 
cl e ar and distinct terms? Otto, as a Rationalist, takes the 
former course. He does not cease to be a Rationalist, nor does he 
ce a se to de al in int ellectual terms$ But he does "notice that 
Rel igion is not exclusively contained and exhaustively comprised 
in any series of 'rational' assertions 11 .2 His reaction to that 
·observation is not to redefine religion so that it may be com-
prised in a series of 1ratiori.al 1 assertions.. He rather sets him-
1. Otto, POR, Author's Notes on the Translation, note no. le 
2.. Otto, IOH,4. 
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self to an "attempt to bring the relation .of the different 
'moments' of religi on to one .another clearly before the mind, 
so that its nature may become mOl"e manifest 11 .. 1 
Otto deals with religi ous knowledge somewhat differently 
in his earlier book, Philosophy .of Rel igion, and in the later one, 
The Idea of the Holy. The difference as has beeri noted, is mainly 
one of levels of development, rather than shift in position.. In 
the earlier book, he writes of knowledge in more strictly intel-
lectual terms. The influence of Kant and Fries is very much in 
evidence, as the original German title, Kantisch-Fries'sche 
Religionsphilosophie, indicates.. The whole approach to the subject 
of knowledge is very much along the lines suggested.by Kant's 
work; Kant would almost agree with Otto that: 
Our knowledge extends over this world in space and time .. 
We have no other knowledge : we can have no other knowledge. 
To go Beyond and Above is impossible: the very problem 
whether there could be any meaning in a Beyond and Above 
would be a waste of .time, and could not present itself to 
us but for two considerations : · Reason ' s own lmowledge of 
the limits of its own knowledge , and the capacity for Ideas ., 2 
Even more suggestive of Kant is· this passage : 
To predicate positively as to the real nature of eternal 
things is not given to us.. No phil o sophy can penetrate 
behind the veil of space and time (except through the 
negation of both). And faith can predicate absolutely 
nothing as to the in se of Deity; just as little as i~ 
can predicate of the WOrld as proceeding through God .. 
The influence of Fries is seen in Otto's use of "feeling" as a 
means of cognizing the Infinite: 
1. Otto; IOH,4., 
2 .. Otto, POR,65 .. 
3~ Otto, POR,99-100. 
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Our intuitive perception is wholly confined to the 
sensuous. It follows that a "comprehending" knowledge, 
a knowledge of the Infinite in positive concepts, is not 
possible for us . The Infinite for u.s is still the In-
comprehensible. But what t he · comprehension cannot 
achieve we may achieve in the Feelings Feeling, with 
Knowledge and Faith, gives a third kind of real know-
ledge , one which combines and unifies both of these--
"Ahnen n. Obscure sentiments of the beautiful and 
sublime in all its phases, in the natural and spiritual 
life, have us in their power: and s o we understand 
without any medium the Ete rnal in the Temporal, and 
the Temporal a s the appearance of the Eternal. Intelli-
gibly enough, positively, although beyond OUl ' power·s 
o.f expression, the worl ' of Faith here manifests its elf 
in the world of Knowledge by means of "Ahnune; '' .1 
These statements from the Philosophy of Religion are quoted 
here t o indicate something of the contrast between Otto's earlier 
and later points of view. Even though he confirms the importanc·e 
of the rational factor in religion is the statement quoted from 
his 1931 "Notes", the contrast is impossible to overlook. The 
outlook of the Philosophy of Religion is much more Kant ian than 
is that of The Ide a of the Hol y: .. Perhaps this i s unaviodable in 
view of Ot t o's intended purpose first to expound the rational, or 
basically philosophical element in rel i gi on.. Or p.erhaps in 
maturing years, Otto's own independen t study · of the religious life 
had made him more independent from the philosophically Rational 
basis for his expositi on.. If Otto had been able to combine all 
his studies into a single work in the phil osophy of religion, he 
might have repeated much of his Kantian Rationalism as a philo-
s ophical basis of knowledge, and then proceeded to expound the 
1 . Otto, POR ,l00-101. 
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importance of rational and non-rat.ional factors for a complete 
understanding of religion. 
A certain incongruity shows through i n Otto ' s Philosophy of 
Religion when he speaks of knowledge which has no "positive 
cognition-contents as to transcendental realities 11 • 1 He proceedes 
in the same context to refer to Luther ' s conception that "God is 
not to be sought for as He is 'in His Majesty' but as He is 'for 
us'.n2 This seems to be contrary to the statements which Otto 
makes when he builds up his argument for the immediate knowledge 
of Reason, which has access to the essences of things. But if 
Otto's purpose in introducing this ineffable quality of God-know-
ledge is recognized, the incongruity is eased. He is approaching 
the subject of the mysterious in the knowledge of God, that non-
rational element in religion which does not lend itself to con-
ceptual definiti on. In his Philosophy of Religion, Otto only 
suggests the effect of the el ement of mystery upon his whole 
system. In The Idea of the Holy, this eff ect is fully carried 
out. 
II . SOURCES OF REhiGI OUS KNOWLEDGE 
A. The A Priori Category of the Holy 
Rel igious knowledge, according t o Otto, is based upon the 
a priori categor~ of the ' holy'. By 'holy ' he means to convey 
1. Otto; POR,99. -
2e Otto, POR,lOO. 
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something different from the ordinary sense of n~orally perfect" 
or completely good" .. Otto claims that these uses are at least 
inaccurate, if not mislea.ding~ While he acknowledges that the 
term 'holy' does denote moral perfection, he insists that it 
has a uclear overplus of meani ng 11 • 1 He holds that by subtra.cting 
from the term its moral and rational connotations, a pure, 
primitive meaning can be obtained. He proposes to find another 
word to use to indicate the primitive meaning of 'holy', which 
will not be weighted down with the moral and rational connotations 
which have grown up around it during the course of religious 
history. The term he wants will des cribe "what was a unique 
original feeling response 11 • 2 Otto writes of his word-building 
in this way: 
For this purpose I adopt a word coined from the Latin 
numen, Omen has given us ominous, and there is no reason 
why from-numen we should not similarly form a word 
'numinous'. I shall speak then of a unique 'numinous' 
category of value and of a definitely 'numinous' state 
of mind, which is always found wherever the category 
is appl ied. This mental state is perfectly sui generis 
and irreducible to any other; and therefore, like every 
absolutely primary datum, while it admits~ of being 
discussed, it cannot be strictly defined.~ 
•rms word "numinous" will indicate a primary datum of feeling, 
which may be discussed, but not defined. 
In his discussion of the elements in the 'numinous', Otto 
l. Otto, IOH,5. 
2.. Otto, IOH,6. 
3~ Otto, IOH,7~ 
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mentions f irst the element of ' creature-feelin g ' . He contrasts 
his own theory of this primary datum of feeling with the theory 
of Schleiermacher. As it was noted in the previous chapter, 
Otto found two defects in Schleiermacher ' s theory. First, Otto 
claims that Schleiermacher failed to distinguish this primary 
feeling from other feelings on qual i tative grounds. Schleier-
macher called it the 11feeling of absolute dependence", which, 
according to Otto, sets it apart only because it is absolute 
and not only relative. It should be set apart because it is 
qualitatively different, as well . The second d efect Otto finds 
in Schleiermacher's theory is that it only infers the object to 
which the feeling responds. It tells more about the one who 
feels than it does about the object which excites the feeling. 
Otto suggests tllis correcti on : 
Rather , the 'creature feel i ng' is itsel1~ a first subjective 
concomitant and effect of another feeling-el ement, which 
casts it like a shadow, but which in itself indubitably 
has immediate and primary reference to an object outside 
the self~l · 
This element, according to Otto, indicates that the 'numinous' 
feeling points to an objective source, which inspires a sense 
of creaturehood. In a footnote, Otto claims that this sense of 
objective reference "must be posited as a primary immediate datUlll 
of consciousness" .. 2 
1. Otto, IOH,lO. 
2. Otto, IOH,ll . 
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B~ The Cognitive Value of Feeling 
In developing his idea oi' feeling, Otto follows much the 
same procedure as has been outlined above in his analysis of the 
other elements of the 'numinous'. There are non-conceptual 
elements, as well as full-grown rational concepts. The proper 
understanding of the feeling-elements is under terms oi' illus-
t rative substitutes for concepts : the non-intellectual ideogram. 
In these ideograms, the mind is dimly aware of the character oi' 
the 'numinous' object which excites the :feelings oi' creaturehood, 
fascination, mysterium, etc. These are but symbolic expressions 
oi' :feelings, and should not be taken for adequate concepts upon 
which an understa nding of the Infinite can be based.1 
Experiences of the 'numinous' type are not entirely without 
a n alogy in other areas of human life.. The experiences of 
aes t hetic feeling of I. the ; sublime 1 may be compared to those oi' 
the 'numinous 1 In each case, the element oi' :foreboding is 
accompanied by an element of attraction. The experience of mora l 
obligation has its analogy to the experience of the 'numinous'. 
In each case here, there is an element of underivability, an 
e l ement of unevolvability~ According to Otto, these analogies 
a re n (·t accidental or superficial. In the "association oi' 
feelings", the concepts of the sublime and of' moral obligation 
have an intrinsic connection with the non-conceptual feelings of 
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the 'numinous' type~ This connection is that of schematization. 
Now the relation of the rational to the non-rational 
element in the idea of the holy or sacred is just such 
a one of schematization, and the non-rational numinous 
fact, schematized_by the rational concepts we have 
suggested above Lthe concepts of ~the sublime' and of 
moral obligatioQ/ , yields us the complex category of 
'holy' itself, richly charged and complete in its 
fullest meaningal . 
It seems that Otto is placing the "non-rational numinous fact" 
parallel to the a priori categories of the understanding; 
that is, the 'numinous fact' is a necessary and universal 
condition of the understanding of experiencea If this is so, 
and it would appear to be the clear meaning of his statement 
and its context, then he is using 'category' not only as a 
universal and necessary principle of understanding the per-
ceptions of the senses, but also as a similarly universal and 
necessary principle of the understanding of perceptions in which 
the senses are not involved~ 'l'his use has been implicit in all 
of Otto's discussions of the categories, and of non-sensory per-
ception. The category of the 'holy', as a complex of non-rational 
nmninous elements and of conceptual elements of aesthetic and 
moral elements, is the principle of the understanding of religious 
experience, which in turn yields knowledge proper to the level 
of the experience and the stage of development ... 
The facts of the numinou s consciousness point therefore--
as likewise also do the 'pure concepts of the understand-
ing' of Kant and the ideas and value-judgments of ethics 
l. Otto, IOH,46. 
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and aesthetics--to a hidden substantive source, from 
which the religious ideas and feelings are formed, which 
lies in the mind independently of sense-experience; a 
pure resson in the profoundest sense, which, because of 
the surpassingness of its content, must be distinguished 
from both the pure theoretical and the pure practical 
reason of Kant, as something yet higher or deeper than 
they.1 
The questions remain as to how these 'numinous experiences' may 
be useful for knowledge, and just what that knowledge is . 
C ~ The Faculty of Divination 
Otto speaks of the religious consciousness of the "still 
small voice" which attests to the holy and the sacred in the 
heart . The man of crude outlook on life will not heed this 
unobtrusive voicee But he who is once aware of its message will 
ever there after be attentive to it. Otto calls this capacity 
for attending to and recognizing this inner voice the faculty 
of "divination" .. This faculty, he says, genuinely cognizes the 
holy in its appearances. 'rhis faculty is akin to the Ahnung 
about which Schleiermacher, Fries and Otto have so much to say. 
One of Otto's paragraphs is particularly rich in description 
of this faculty of divination: 
What Schleiermacher is .·fee.ling after is really the 
faculty or capacity of deeply absorbed contemnlation, 
when confronted by the vast, living totality and 
reality of things as it is in nature and history. 
1'\Jherever a mind is exposed' in a spirit of absorbed 
submission to impressions of the •universe', it 
becomes capable--so he lays down- - of experiencing 
'intuitions and feelings ' of something that is, 
1. Otto, IOH,ll7-ll 8* 
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as it were, a sheer overplus, in addition to empirical 
real ity.. This overplus , while it cannot be apprehended 
by mere theorectic cognition of the world and the co smic 
system in the form i t assumes for science, can neverthe~ 
less be reelly and truly grasped and experienced in 
intuit ion, and is given form in single 'intuitions'. 
And these, in turn, assu~e shape in definite statements 
and proposi t ions, capable of a certain gropi ng formulation, 
which are not without analogy with theoretic propositions , 
but are to be clearly distinguished from them by their 
free and merely felt, not reasoned character. In them-
selves they are groping intimations of meanings figura-
tively apprehended.. 1'hey cannot be employed as statements 
of doctrine in the strict sense, and can neither be built 
into a sys tem nor u s ed as premises for theoretical con-
clusions .. But, though these intuitions are limited and 
inadequate, they are none the less true, i. e., true as 
far as they go; and for all Schleiermacher's aversion to 
the word in this connexion they must certainly be termed 
cognitions, modes of knowing, though, of course, not the 
product of reflection, but the intuitive outcome of fe el-
ing .. l 
Otto's formulation of thi s faculty of divination is the 
link between his philosophical Rat ionalism and his religious 
non-rationalism.. Divination has its basis in the demons tration 
of the powers of Reason to cognize the essences of things .. 
This theory of divination is a genuine, solidly rationalist 
theory, put together with rigid concepts in a strict 
demonstrative form e.nd intended as such. It claims that 
the capacity or faculty of divination is the under -
standing, the faculty of reflection in concept and 
demonstration. 'rhe transcendent is here proved as 
strictly as anything can be proved, logically from 
given premises.2 
While divination is a term peculiar to The Idea of the Holy, 
the seeds of the theory are discernible in Otto ' s Phi.losophy 
of' Religion .. In the earlier work, Otto points out that 
1. Otto, IOH,l50-l5l. 
2. Ot t o, IOH,l49. 
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religion is not to be "intellectualized" (p. 35), although faith 
has 11 a firm base in the reasoning intellect" (p. 43). He goes 
on to say that "Faith is cognition which Reason possesses purely 
as reason'' (p8 99), while Ahnen, a form of Ahnung, combines both 
faith and knowledge (p. 100-101).. In his 1931 "Notes 11 , Otto 
points out that: 
Ahnun4i is no t so much "man's deepest longing and need" as 
a Gefuhl , in the sense mentioned above. LJhe note referred 
to reads: "The
11
German expression Gefllhl is not quite 
1 emotion' . Gefuhl ca.n mean a for•m of cognizance in an 
unc onceptual or pre conceptual way .. 11 / It comes very near 
t o what I have described in The Idea of the Holy as 
11 divination". 1 
rrhus it would appear that Otto ha.s been moving toward just s uch 
a formulation as his faculty of divinati on since the wri ting 
of his Philosophy of Religion, and produces it in mature form 
in 1'he Idea of the Holy. 
The questi on remains as to the nature of the cognitive value 
of divination. What does divination mean for knowledge? The 
answer lies in the realm of the numinous, inasmuch as this 
numinous quality may be said to characterize an element of reality .. 
Divination is the mode of cognition of the numinous element of 
Reality: the mysterious, non-rational factor of religion.. An 
experience of divination, then, would have the value of recognition 
of some aspect of religious reality. Otto says in this connec t ion : 
We find, that is, involved in the numinous experience, 
beliefs and feelings qualitatively different from any-
1. Otto, POR, Author's Notes on the Trenslation, note to p. 1 35. 
80 
thing that 'natural' sense-perception is capable of 
giving use They are themselves not perceptions at 
all, but peculiar interpretations and valuations at 
first of perceptual data, and then--at a higher 
level--of' posited objects and entities, which 
themselves no longer bel ong t o the perceptual world, 
but are thought of as supplementing and transcending 
•t l l • 
On the primitive level, anything might be assumed to g i ve rise 
to numinous experience, but a higher level of religious judgment 
shows that false recognition was made. 2 Thus Otto does not hold 
that divination is, of itself, a sure guide t o the recognition of 
the holy, but that the deliverances ot: divins.tion must be sub-
mitted to the religious (rational) judgment. 'l'his religious 
judgment is developed when it is put to use, and is capable of 
refinement and higher discriminat ion. This is the process of the 
elevation of the non-rational element of religion by the rational 
element which is a mark of the superiority of a particular re-
ligion in its own development and in contrast with others. 
The faculty of divination is an element of the rational 
capacity of men generally .. This does not mean that every man is 
in active possession of this faculty, any more than every man is 
in active possession of rational capacity, or that all men are on 
l evel ground with regard to thi s capacity. The faculty of divi-
nation is a potentiality of every man, and of some individuals 
more than others. In contrast .with a certain type o:f rationalism, 
1. Otto, IOH,ll7a 
2e Otto, IOH,l48 .. 
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however, Otto does not hold that the level of the faculty of 
divination is conditioned by the level of· rational capacity as 
l 
a whole. 
The implications of Otto 's formulation of his theories of 
the 'numinous' and 'divination' for the study and practice of 
mystical religion can scarcely be overlooked, or left unmentioned . 
It is not the purpose of this study to investigate Otto's theology 
or even his own attractive and provocative discussions of Christian 
experience . It should be noted, however, that in The Idea of' the 
Holy , Otto carries out the application of his theorie s to his-
torical and contemporary Christianity. In his studies of non-
Christian religions, he attempts to correlation his theories of 
religious experience with the phenomena of those religions. 
III. THE Dl:!!V.hlLOPME:N'l' OF O'l'TO 1 S RELIGIOUS .I:!;P ISTEiVIOLOGY 
Throughout the present chapter, references have been made to 
indications of development of seed-thoughts from Otto's Philosoph_y 
of Religion into The Idea of the Holy. The significance of this 
development in certain aspects of his religi ous epistemology seem 
to warrant further notice~ 
A. Feeling of Truth and Divination 
In his Ph·tlosophy of Religion, Otto says that the Feeling of 
Truth gives "obscure and deep experiences which compel us to 
1,. Otto, POR,l54~ 
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recognize them as valid 11 " 1 This indicates the condition of the 
Immediate Knowledge of Reason, which in turn yields the a priori 
categories of knowledge~ This usage is suggestive of Otto's 
characterization of divination as a "dim, obscure conception11 • 2 
The orientation of the "F'eeling of Truth" is philosophical, while 
t ha t of divination is religious~ 
Otto holds that the a priori nature of the nFeeling of 'l'ruth11 
indicates that they must indeed be both necessary and universal. 
That is, this 11primal obscurity'* in which immediate Knowledge 
ex ists prior to exp erience is part of the constitutive principles 
of Reason itself, and therefore not open to question .. 3 This hyper-
critical certainty does not carry over into divination, however. 
Indeed, Otto is expl i cit in his insis tance that divination may lead to 
mistakes. 4 The appeal in each case, however, is to a "principle of 
completeness", which validates Reason itself. If the "Feeling of 
Truth" should lea d to mistaken conceptions, these would be di s -
covered by the "supreme law for the essence of things, 'the 
principle of compl eteness 111 • 5 If divination should lead to a 
mistaken conception, the "religious judgment" which develops and 
is purified with increasing appreciation for holiness. 6 Otto does 
not say what happens when the rational law or the religious 
1. Otto, POR,59. 
2.. Otto, IOH,l48. 
3.. Otto, ?OR,47 . 
4.. Otto, IOH,l48. 
5. Otto, ?OR,79 . 
6. Otto, IOH,148. 
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judgment fails to develop, but he does indicate the grounds on 
which they mav develop. 
B~ The Categories and the Religious A Priori 
It is not unusual that a Kantian philosopher such as Otto 
should devote himself largely to the exposition of the categories 
of the Understanding~ Otto held Kant 's discovery of the a priori 
categories to be the "great task of Kantian Criticism of · Reason 11.,1 
His principal difference with Kant's concept of the categories 
concerned their validity as to the real nature of things. Otto's 
arguments for the 'particular concept of the objective validity of 
the categories has been presented in an earlier chapter of this 
thesis, and does not bear repetition here~ It is significant, 
however, that in his Philosophy of' Relig!-on Otto points out the 
importance of the discovery of "'religious categories' which are 
t o exist side by side with the 'natural categories', equal to 
them in their independence, their validity, and importance"~2 
If these religious categories are to apply only to subjective 
presentations, they will be of little value~ If, however, the 
categories generally apply to a necessary and 11fundamental 
condition of all Being", then a religious category might apply to 
knowledge of an objective, independent, real Being, understood in 
religious terms .. 3 The a priori category of the holy is a category 
l . Otto, POR,l8. 
2 ., Otto, POR,l8-l9. 
3. Otto, POR,52. 
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of the understanding, but it nevertheleBs applies to knowledge of 
an independent, real Being.l 
In his use of the terminology of "religious a priori category 11 , 
Otto is extending the language which has been associated .funda-
mentally with Kant f'ar beyond the limits that Kant would have 
allowed .. Windelband says of Kant's att1tude toward religion: 
Only that can be a priori in religion which is based 
upon morals.. Kant's religion of reason is, therefore, 
not a natural religion, but "moral theology" .. 2 
Kant ' s method of criticism of reason is so "tied down" to 
empiricism that it is difficultto justlfy Otto's use of this 
method as he uses it on the .grounds upon which Kant formulated it .. 
Otto's only appeal from the indictment of unlawful use of Kantian 
method would be in his insistence upon the basically empirical 
character o.f religious experience.. 'rhe difference is not in the 
objectivity of the experience as sensory or non-sensory, but 
rather in the nature of the evidence whi.ch the experience will 
yield, on the one hand public and on the: other hand private. 
c. Transcendental Idealism and The Idea. of the Holy 
A thorough-going discussion of the progression of Otto's 
thought from his basic philosophical position, Transcendental 
Idealism, to his mature religious philosophy which is embodied 
in The Idea of the Holy would require more extensive treatment 
1. Otto, IOH,lO .. 
2. Windelband, H0?, 556 .. 
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than is warranted in this study~ It will be worthwhile, however, 
to indicate the development of Otto's religious epistemology with-
in the framework of' his basic philosophical position. 1 
Otto holds that the cosmos is to be understood as one unif'ied 
whole consisting of' two factors, the seen and the unseen, or as 
Kant would have it, the phenomenal and the noumenal worlds~ But 
the noumenal is to be understood in terms of the phenomenal and 
vice-versa . The .temporal is a representation of the eternal. 
'l'he temporal is cognized in terms of time and space, and this 
cognition is limited, that is, not complete. But cognit ion is a 
complex, the possib:i.li ty of which is given by the structure of' 
Reason itself. Reason not only provides categories for the under-
standing of temporal cognition, but it also provides ideas for the 
cognizance of t"he unseen, essential qualities of things. Reason 
also makes use of its own pre-conceptual cognitions through :feel-
ing. Inherent in Reason's own immediate knowledge is the "supreme 
law for the essences of things, the 'principle of completion 1 ". 2 
Thus both the categories of the understanding of' the temporal 
world and the ideal understanding of the essences of things must 
have part in any truly rational · cognition. 
In his Philosophy of Rel igion, Otto uses the term "Ideal 
Knowledge 11 • In his 1931 "Notes", he explains that he intends this 
term to stand for cognitio as opposed to scientia.. Thus he says: 
l. Otto, POR~41-43. · 
2. Otto, POR,79 ~ emphasis suppliede 
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A world of faith can be opposed to a world of scientia, 
but ought not to be opposed to a world of cognitio • 
••• Faith stands in opposition to "knowledge" as 
scientia, but faith »•• claims to be a cognitio.l 
In this sense, faith may stand in opposition to the knowledge of 
the temporal world, while it coincides with knowledge of the 
essences of things through ideas.. In the Philosophy of Religiony 
however, Otto holds that 11Faith first becomes really vital as 
moral Trustn, which is contrary to the spirit, if not the letter, 
of The Idea of the Holy .. 2 
Ideal knowledge, which as cognitio is equated in quality 
with faith, presents a view of the universe according to the 
"principle of completeness". In this view, which Otto credits to 
Fries, Transcendental Ideas yield an understanding of Reality 
which is complete as opposed to the incomplete knowledge derived 
3 from the temporal world . The whole table of categories is 
schematized ideally, rs.ther than temporally. A rational under-
st a.nding of Reality s the result which Otto claims.. The final 
category, that of Conm1unity , is the importDnt one for the present 
d iscussion. It is the i dea~ schematization of this category which 
elevates it into the idea of Deity: 
TlL category of Community can only be conceived, e.s 
completed_, as the opera clon of one unified, essential, 
necessary, extramundane Cause of All in general 84 
1. Otto, POR, Author's Notes on the Translation, note to p8 24. 
2.. Otto, POR,99. 
3 ~ Otto, POR,81. 
4 . Otto, POR,87. 
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The Idea of Deity is not to be known only by conceptual thinking, 
however ~ 
Not by faith alone can we in conviction confront the 
world of Appearance with the true one, the World of 
Idea; we can become aware of the latter as a realit1, 
and a reality fraught with blessing, by experience. 
Therefore, the Idea of Deity is a. conception which refers to a 
Being outside the conceiving self, and that Being is somehow in 
relation to the conceiving self. The possibility of such re-
lationship is philosophically, rationally founded in Otto's 
Philosouhy of Religion. The nature and meaning of that re-
lationship is taken up in The Idea of the Holy. 
l. Otto, POR, 92. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
CHI'l' ICI SMS OF OT'l'O 1 S EPISTEMOLOGY 
Ac cording to the method mentioned at the outset of this 
undertaking, the major criticisms of Ot t o's thought have been 
reserved until a stra ight-forward exposition of his views had 
been made. In accordance with thfs plan, four major lines of 
criticism are presented in this chapter, along. with a · critical 
surnma.tion.. These have been selected partly because of the 
comprehensiveness of the treatment given the whole of Otto' s 
works, and partly because they cover a fairly wide range of 
criticism .. 
I.· J:'Jill CRITIC ISM OF D. C. MACINTOSH 
Macintosh reveals his deep bias against Otto, and perhaps 
most of the other German theologians of his day, in the closing 
paragraphs of hi s section on Otto: 
We would insist that it is high time for. the dead 
hand of Kantian dualistic epistemology to be removed 
from the bovved head of German theology.l 
He includes Otto in this group of head-bowed the ologians, since 
Otto follows Kantian epistemology so far as Macintosh can see. 
l. Macintosh, RK,303 ~ 
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Macintosh focuses upon the element of Otto's work in his Philosophy 
of Religion and in 'rhe Idea of the Holy which has to do with the 
n on-rational side of religious knowledge.. The dif'ficul ty, according 
to Macintosh, is that Otto has gotten to the place where he can 
have no positive and true knowledge · of God, but can rely only upon 
a positive feeling of God's reality and presence. 
As Otto conceives it, ••• Gpd is (supposedly) known to 
be unknowable, and theology to be not literally true, 
but literally not true, of the ~ternal , i~ e., of the 
timeless object in which religion at all times is 
interested .. .. .. .. Otto 1 s syst·ematic theology turns 
out, then to be simply an e:specially food example of 
the theology of a religious agnostic. 
Macintosh overlooks the significant features of Otto's episte-
mology which guard against subjectivism .. Otto makes it clear 
enough that categorial knowledge and ideal knowledge, while 
constituted in rational form by the activity of the mind, never-
t heless do genuinely cognize an independent , real Being .. 2 While 
Ot t o did lay the foundations of his religious epistemology in 
Kantian-Friesian Rationalism, he did not overlook the empirical 
nature of religious experience. Indeed, the whole purpose of the 
formulation of the theory of divinationis an attempt to account 
for religious experience ~ 3 
Macintosh objects to the emphasis Otto gives to the non-
rational side of religion . 4 He holds that Otto tends to divest 
1.. Macintosh, PRK, 299-300 . 
2 . Otto, POR,lOl .. 
3. Otto, IOH,l45. 
4 . Macintosh, PRK,302 .. 
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God of "all rationality and all ideal spiritual qualities 11 • 1 
rrhis is a most unusual criticism to be leveled at one who is at 
the same time called a 11rather extreme critical rationalist". 2 
It is even more unusual since Otto is quite explicit in the 
opening pages of The Idea of the Holy in his insistence that ra-tion-
ality is a mark of superiority in religion, and in view of the 
fact that most of the remainder of the book is taken up with 
the faculty of divination, which is a cognitive, rational faculty. 3 
'£he only conclusion which would seem justified is that 
Macintosh tells more about himself' than he does about Otto. 
II. THE CRI':PICISM OF J. M .. I~WORE 
While Macintosh derides Otto for knowing too little, J. M. 
N~oore takes the position that Otto claims too nruch for his 
epistemology. Moore, however, is on firm philosophical ground 
in the questions that he raises.. Moore takes the position that 
truth should be predicated of a hypothesis which has been verified 
as to its cognitive value~ This verification would presumably 
be made on empirical grounds. Moore objects that Otto's claim that 
numinous experience is immediately and directly cognitive en-
counters the same dif'ficul ty as all claims to direct immediate 
knowledge : namely, that experience becomes cognitive by becoming 
1. Macintosh, PRK,302. 
2. Macintosh, fRK,303w 
3. Otto, IOH,l49 
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reflective. Moore has perhaps overlooked the cognitive content, 
the intellectual value of what Otto calls numinous experience. 
Otto did not claim that any single such experience or a whole 
lifetime of such experiences would yield a single conceptual 
hypothesis about the nature of God8 He did insist that all the 
possible concepts, however verified, could not exhaust the 
nature of God. Moore's citation of page 24 of The Idea of the 
Holy as an example of Otto's use of' numinous experience for 
the purpose of constructing theological doctrines is erroneous 
on Moore's part .. What Otto is saying on page 24 is that B1 ichte 
and Schopenhauer are guilty of using 'ideograms' as though they 
were adequate concepts for the building of a 1 scientif:i.c' know-
ledge. Otto is actually accusing t .he two whom he name::1 of the 
same thing of which Moore accuses hi:ril .. l 
Ivloore's criticism of Otto's claim that numinous experience 
has direct cognitive value is not well taken. While numinous 
experience is direct experience, it isnot necessarily final 
cognitively~ Otto holds that divination, which is the discernment 
of the nv~inous, is open to error, and must be subject to religious 
judgment .. 2 
III .. CRI'I'ICISM OF A. C. KNUDSON 
Knudson deals with Otto mainly under the consideration of 
1.. Otto, IOH,24. 
2. Otto, IOH,l48 .. 
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Immediacy as a basis for the cognitive value of religious 
experiencee As usual, Dean Knudson ' s treatment of the subject 
is fe.ir and enlightening8 While he does not share Otto ' .s view 
that religio}ls experience is ·inherently :. different fr0rn sense 
experience, and must be under stood on its own terms, he is will ing 
and anxious to speak to Otto's position on common terms .. 1 Knu_dson 
criticizes Otto's theory of numinous experience as direct appre-
hension of the Di vine on psychological grounds.. It is no more 
likely that religious experience would be cognitively valid than 
it is that sense experience would be, according to Knudson. He 
draws attention to the highly potent influences of the beliefs of 
others upon any individual's reli gious experience . 2 He agrees 
with Otto that religious experience cannot be accounted f'or solely 
on the basis of expectancy.. It is the experience that gives rise 
0:0:. to the expectancy. u 
Knudson very aptly terms Otto's theory of rel i gious experience 
the "highest degree" of relative immediacy, as opposed to absolute 
immediacy and pure objectivity. He p·oints out that while Otto held 
to the strict immediacy of religious experience, in that it is 
underi ved and in se original, it carries no gue.rentee of cognitive 
validity . 4 Knudson further indicates that the popular appraisal 
of The Idea of the Holy as confirming the truth of relJ.gious 
1. Knudson, VRE,83. 
2. Knudson, VRE,90. 
3. Knudson, VRE,93. 
4 . Knudson, VRE,89. 
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experience because of the immediacy of such experience may not 
1 be justified. In the light of some of the res.ctions to Otto 
which have been encountered in the course of the present study, 
t l1is unwise apprs.isa.l is more than simply a popu:J-ar one.. If 
the terms Otto employs and his epistemological basis are not kept 
clearly in mind, some of his statements in his Philosophy of 
Religion will give evidence for this "popular appraisal 11 • 'rhis 
is true also, but in lesser degree, of' The Idea of the Holy . 
IV~ •r HE CRI'riCISM OF R~ F .. DAVIDSON 
Professor Davidson has the distinction of being the only 
person listed in any catalogue currently available as the author 
of a book about Otto written in Bnglish. His book is thorough 
and definit i ve . His criticisms c ove1~ a wider range tnan simply 
Otto's epistemology. His analysis of Otto's use of the terms 
'non - r ational' and • non~conceptual' is most acute. He demonstrates 
thB. t much of Otto t s ambiguity , and the mistaken interpretations 
that have followed that ambiguity would be avoided by a more 
guarded distinction between the two terms., While it is Otto's 
purpose to portray the category of t h e holy .as 11 inaccessible to 
our conceptual thought 11 , he doe$ not want to give the impr•e s sion 
that i t therefore is not possibl e nor desirable to rationally 
distinguish lower from higher forms of the numinous representation. 
1 . Knudson, VRE,87 ., 
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Davidson suggests that "Instead of selecting the ambiguous term 
'non- rational' to indicate the indepen~ent character of religious 
l{nowledge , he might well have confined himself to the less 
equivocal 'non-conceptual'" • 1 
V. CRITICAL SUIYIIVATION 
Otto deals with epistemology under t erms of rational and 
non- rational knowledge. This is more characteristic of his 
, 
religious epistemology than of his basic philosophical position. 
This division of knowledge along lines of rationality would better 
serve Otto's purpose if less ambiguous terms, such as Davidson 
suggests, had been used. 2 Otto's purpose was not to show that 
tnere is a kind of knowledge that is non-rational in origin or 
nature, but rather to give an account of that factor in rational 
knowledge which is non-conceptual and non-intellectual~ 
Otto claims that Kan t 's inference of the ideality of a priori 
types of lmowledge is unwarranted .. 3 'l'his claim has been justified 
on the basis of . the arguments whichhave been discussed in this 
study. It has been shown that Kent did draw this inference (see 
p. 36-39 above). It has also been shown that Otto's claim can 
be reinforced with the comments of other Kantian commentators 
(see p,. 39 above). 'I'he conclusion that Otto draws is that a priori 
1. Davidson, ROIR,l83. 
2. Davidson, ROIR,l83 . 
3 . Otto, POR, 18. 
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categories may apply to knowledge of independent objects and 
entities, and are descriptive of Reality (seeP ~ 41 above). 
Otto remains a Rationalist from beginning to end. He finds 
the basis for all recognition of Reality in Pure Reason alone. 
This means that his test of validity is often misleading. In 
several instances, he speaks of "self-eviderit" truth, which is 
taken to be valid simply because it is independent of experience. 
v~hlle his confidence in Kant 's critical method may be justified 
so far as it goes , he seems carried away with the possibilities, 
and all too readily extends Kant ' s method beyond the limits to 
which Kant would have allowed it. It is difficult to see how 
the critical method would have come to the rtfa c t of Reason's 
confidence, that it possesses real knowledge".l 
This "fact" of Reason's self- confidence is not the final 
appeal for validity, however. Otto comes to a k i nd. of Rational 
Coherence as a criterion of truth$ 2 This 11 pl"'inciple of complete-
ness" would hold that the Rational foundation for truth is the 
maxim: "Real Existence can only be conceived in completed totality 
of that which is 11 • 3 While this principle ra.ay have its roots in 
Kant's system, it is not at all the principle which .Kant held, 
that conception and sensation are mutually dependent. Indeed one 
of Otto's fundamental breaks with Kant is nowhere explicitl y 
l. Otto, POR,77 . 
2. Otto, POR ,79. 
3. Otto, POR,79-80 . 
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defended by Otto. This break comes on the issue of the extent 
or content of empirical intuition.. Kant held that empirical 
intuition required the apprehension of an outward sensory 
stimulant. 1 Otto, however, uses the term experience to cover 
situations in which supposed apprehension· of some independent 
entity is realized without sensory stimulation at all . On Kant's 
terms, religious experience , or what Ot.to calls divination would 
hardly be possible. While Otto grounds his new theory of spiritual 
apprehension upon Rational criticism, he goes far beyond Kant's 
empirical intuition, but does not acknowledge this to be so. ·rm s 
represents one of Otto's real advances within the critical system. 
Kant's insistence upon the necessity of sensory refe~ence in ex-
perience fails to take account .of the non-sensory capacity of the 
mind for cognition and comprehension of meaning . 
While the notion of Regulative Ideas is prominent :Ln Kant's 
work, the whole import of Otto's work is that Ideas are consti-
tutive of knowledge. This follows the break with Kant over the 
validity of non-sensory cogni ti.on, and Otto would be more con-
vincing in both instances if he had pointed out why and how these 
breaks come about. Otto credits Fries with improving upon Kant's 
concept of 'rranscendental Ideas .. 2 Fries gave Otto his clue to the 
Ideal view of the universe, which indeed is opposed .to the view of 
the universe which Kant based upon time and space, so far as he 
1. Kant, 1ffiV,65. 
2. Otto, POR,l7. 
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e .... 1 w n v .. 
Otto's most startling use of the cognition of non-sensory 
entities shows in his theory of 11 creature feeling 11 , as opp osed to 
Schleiermacher's theory of 11feeling of absolute dependence 11 .. Otto 
holds that, i n numinous , or religious experience, the experient 
knows non-conceptually that he is confronting an Other to whom 
he bears the relation of creature to Creator . (see p . 25-26 above) 
It is difficult to see how this would be immediately known, as 
Otto holds it would be, on purely rational grounds . This theory 
would presuppose the self-revelation of the Other, and not simply 
a recognition on the part of the experient w Thus Otto's theory of 
reli g ious feeling is better understood if it is taken as a theory 
of revelation, which indeed Otto hints, but does not explicitly 
This implication of self-revelation is strongly presupp osed 
in the whole concept of 'rhe I dea of the Holy . For on what other 
basis can the idea of 11holy 11 become the experience of God, or 
vice-verse.? Unless the idea of the Holy (One) is a human concept 
of t h e Being who re~eals Himself as Deity, how can such an idea 
h a v e any more relevance than any other idea? Do ideas have the 
power of self-expression'? And do ideas have the will to express 
themselves? Do all the different ideas of which men might be 
conscious vie with one another for a cognitive welcome into men's 
l. Otto, POR, 81. 
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minds? 
The only way Otto's formulation of cognition of Deity ca.n 
make sense is on the basis of the a priori capacity for this 
cognition on the human side, and the self-revealing nature of 
the Ot her who is cognized ~ This d oe s not mean that there are as 
ma.ny self-revealing enti"i.~:i..es as th'3re are cognitions, but rathe1• 
that there are as many conditions of the a priori capacity as there 
a re cognitions. The faculty of divlnation differs in clarity 
a.nd power between individuals 1 and also the religious judgment 
differs between individuals~ Thus divination may be at the genius 
l evel and judgment at the imbecile level, or any combination in 
between. The validity of cognition is to be judged otherwise in 
the 1 ight of the "principle of completeness". Otto's formule.tion 
in The Idea of the Holy lacks just this final criterion of Rational 
Coherence~ He fails to give an adequate account of the development 
of religious judgment and the place of inference in religious in-
sight . This is understandable in the light of Otto's purpose to 
elucidate the non-ration element of religion, and to rely upon 
the self-validation of "personal divination" . 1 
In The Idea of the Holv , Otto claims that religion is 
completely independent of ethics and aesnhetics . 2 This was not 
claimed in his Philosop&_ of Religion (see p. 87 above). Having 
claimed this, he found so much inner rels.tionship between religious 
J.. Otto 1 10H,l78~ 
2 . Otto, IOH,5. 
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consciousness and t hat of ethi.es and aesthetics that it was 
neces sary t0 formulate an a priori principle , such as the schemati -
zation of the categ ri e s of the underst anding in temporal a.nd 
s patial events •1 It is difficult t o understand just hmv i ndep endent 
reli i ous consciousness may be , if on· the a priori level, it is 
as sociated with othe:r• fa c t ors. This would seem to be · the hard way 
of stating the really simple, appar ent principle of the mind's 
capaci t y to respond according to its own structure to whatever 
stimulates it • . 
1. Otto, Ioq,46-47~ 
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CONCLUSIONS 
Rudolf Otto's epistemology is but one facet of a very rich 
and profound philosophy of religion& Otto does not sacrifice 
originality and coherence for the sake ·of conformity to accepted 
patterns. His main purpose was the ~lucidation of the non-
conceptual element of religious knowledge, within the framework 
of an epistemological Rationalism. 
Otto's philosophical orientation placed him within the Neo-
Friesian school of Kantianism. The purpose of the Neo-Friesian 
school was to maintain and extend Kant's critical method, but to 
improve upon Kant's concepts of the cognitive value of the a priori 
categories of th~ understanding and the Transcendental Ideas Of 
I 
Pure Reason. This improvement is maintained by Otto's rigorous 
application of the cri t ical method beyond the limitations of 
empirical intuition which Kant kept. 
The view of the Universe which Otto ·characterizes as 
Transcendental Idealism is culminated by the idea of an independent, 
extra-mundane Cause who, in turn, is not only the object of con-
caption as the I dea of the Holy, but is . also the object of cog-
nition by means of the faculty of divination. The understanding 
of Real . Existence must take into account the "principle of com-
pleteness", which requires a.nd supports both empirical knowledge 
in sensory cognition, and ideal knowledge in conceptual cognition. 
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Appearance is a limited representation of Reality; Fai t h, or ideal 
knowledge, is the apprehension of Reality in its essential com-
pleteness. 
Religion cannot be understood apart from the recognition of 
the element of mystery which gives rise to the non-conceptual 
apprehension of meaning in religious experience. This apprehension 
takes on cognitive significance in the exercise of the faculty of 
divination. This faculty is an element of Reason itself, acting 
on the level of feeling. The cognitive value of divination is 
limited to the preconceptual level. Its deliverances must be 
arbitrated by religious judgment ·before any claim to conceptual, 
verifiable knowledge can .be made. Otto fails . to formul ate any 
comprehensive theory oi• practice of this religious judgment. 
The nature of religion is such that its a priori quality is 
conditioned by the structure of the mind, which includes other 
a priori elements. Thus the religious element is but one of 
several a priori elements, ~uch as the moral, the aesthetic and 
the logical. As such, originality belongs to the mind, and not 
to any of its several a priori elements. 
Otto has been criticized more in caricature than i n 
characterization. His claims for the immediacy of religious 
apprehension have been taken as cla.ims of cognitive finality 
for divination, which is not his contention. This misinterpretation 
arises from his insistence that the religious object is not simply 
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inferred from a quality of self-consciousness, but rather excites 
an awareness of mystery and awesomeness. The meaning of this 
mystery is not given in direct cognitive perception, but in 
continued contemplation and judgment. Otto is not clear as to 
the criterion by which judgment is made. Indications of a 
criterion of Rational Coherence are found in some places, and in 
other places the appeal for validity is left to the conviction 
inspired by personal divination. 
A final conclusion must take into consideration what seems 
to be the only basis for Otto's religious epistemology: the 
a priori capacity of the human mind for the idea of the Holy, and 
the self-revelation of the Holy One. Only upon this basis is 
divination of religious truth possible and verifiable. Only as 
the self-revelation of God inspires conviction of truth in the 
cognitive content of personal divination can there be religious 
conviction, on the grounds of Otto's epistemology. 
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ABSTRACT 
Rudolf Otto's principal aim was the elucidation of religious 
knowledge on its own terms. As a philosopher, he was part of the 
Neo-Friesian school of Kantian critical philosophy. As a philoso-
pher of religion, he followed Luther and Schleiermacher principally. 
Otto made important changes in the epistemological theories of 
Kant, and the religious theories of Schleiermacher. Th ese changes 
are not of uniform quality, however. Some are the outgrowth of 
Otto's Rationalistic use of the critical method, and some are upon 
religious antonomy. 
Within Otto's own system, there are indications of development 
of ideas over a period of years. His early work, Philosophy of 
Religion, was intended to lay a philosophical foundation for his 
whole system, and to treat the rational ·. element in religious 
knowledge . His later work, The Idea of the Holy, wa.s intended 
to build upon the philosophical foundation already laid, and to 
treat the non-rational, or non-conceptual, element in religious 
knowledge . Many concepts are carried over from the earlier work 
to the later, but many innovations are introduced in The Idea of 
~he Holy which do not appear in the Philosophy of Religion. On 
the whole, it is fair to state that Otto's epistemology must be 
understood against the background of his Philosophy of Religion, 
but that his mature epistemological formulation is found in 
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The Idea of the Holy. 
Otto bases his epistemology upon the rationalistic approach, 
using Kant's critical method. Pure Reason is his source of the 
conditions and possibility of knowledge, and also the source of 
conceptual, constitutive ideas. Otto breaks sharply with Kant 
upon the issues of the cognitive value of the a priori categories 
of knowledge, and the ideas of Pure Reason. Kant held that know-
ledge of spatia-temporal events is constituted according to the 
a priori principles of the understanding, and that the a priori 
nature of tha t knowledge is itself an indication of the ideality 
of that which is known. Otto, on the other hand, held that this 
inference is not warranted, that apriority is no indication of 
itself of ideality. He held, as do some other Kantian commentators, 
and following the Neo-Friesian interpretation of Kant, that a priori 
types of knowledge may refer to real, independent entities. The 
constitutive activity of the mind does not in itself render that 
to which it responds dependent upon the mind, existentially or 
essentially. Otto extends the possibility of cognitive experience 
to cover non-sensory awareness, while Kant insisted that only 
objects of sensory perception were cognitively valid. 
Kant had maintained that non-sensory, mental conceptions or 
ideas were not constitutive of knowledge, but regulative only. 
Otto holds, on the nand, that in the Idea of Pure Reason give the 
necessary conditions under which Reality exists. This brings him 
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to the rational conclusion that the "principle of completeness" 
must be followed in the understanding of Real Existence. This 
principle of Rational Coherence gives the possibility and the 
necessity for the validity of knowledge in sense perception and 
in ideal conception. Otto also. introduces the Friesian concept 
of ttFeeling of Truth" as a cognitive faculty which apprehends 
Reality in a precbnceptual way. 
Otto's concern for the rational element in religion is manifest 
in the opening pages of The Idea of the Holy, as well as in his 
Philosophy of Religion. He holds that the superiority of any 
religion is to be judged according to the rational cont ent of its 
conception of God. But he also recognizes what he cal l s the non-
rational element of relig ion. This is the element of mystery to 
which primitive relig ions g i ve so much evidence, and to which the 
so-called higher religions point by implication. The tendency, 
however, is for the elevating development of a religion to obscure 
this non-rational element as definition of doctrine and practice 
continue. 
Otto hopes to re-evaluate the non-rational element of religion, 
and to establish a sound rational basis upon which the knowledge 
of religion on its own terms can be possible. Otto hol ds that this 
non-rational element of religion is of the nature of "creature-
feeling", in wh ich one feels himself to be confronting his Creator. 
The rational basis for the knowledge of this element of religion 
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is found in the a priori category of the holy. For Otto, categories 
apply to knowledge of real, independent entities. Thus the re-
ligious category of knowledge is knowledge of the religious object, 
the "numen", as Otto terms it. The mode of cognition of the 
numinous is called the faculty of divination, which is itself a 
rationa.l element. Divination seems to be an outgrowth of the 
"Feeling of Truth" which appears in Otto's Philosophy of Religion. 
The faculty of divination ddes not render final cognitive 
judgments concerning religiou s objects. Otto recognizes that 
divination in its crude stages takes almost anything as a religious 
object in some meaning or other. Indeed, in the higher types of 
religion, symbols and types are given religious meaning which 
should be accorded only the objects of numinous experience. Re-
ligious judgment may develop to discard unworthy divinations, and 
to retain worthy ones • . Otto's epis t emology lacks any clear formu-
lation of religious judgment. From the philosophical point of view, 
represented in Ot t o's Philosophy of Religion, the criterion of 
Rational Coherence might be applied, and from the reli gious point 
of view, represented in The Ide a of the Holy, the quality of the 
Object of personal divination is self-accrediting. 
From the point of view of The Idea of the Holy, the divination 
of God is such that not only the a priori capacity of the mind for 
religious knowledge is a factor, but the self-revelation of God is 
also a factor. The faculty of divination, no matter how well grounded 
107 
r a tionally, has no way of judging of itself. The religious 
judgment must arbitrate according to "the principle of' completeness", 
or Rational Coherence, and only as God revealed Himself could an 
idea which conceived His Real Existence be coherent. On the basis 
of Otto's epistemology, the basis of religious knowledge is reve-
lation, and Otto 1 s theory of religious lmowledge is a theory of 
r evelation. 
The criticisms which have been made against Otto's episte-
mology generally fall into two categories: those that criticize 
him for claiming too much finality for knowledge in religious 
experience, and those that criticize him for emphasizing too much 
t h e non-rational element of religious knowledge. Otto could have 
a voided the former criticisms by being more explicit as to the 
non-judicial character of religious awareness, and by formulating 
a t heory of religious judgment. He could have avoided the latter 
criticisms by the use of " n on-conceptualn or some less ambiguous 
t erm rather than the often misunderstood term "non-rational". 
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